BOOK VII - CHAPTER XV

________________________________________________
_ As there is one end common to a man both as an individual and a
citizen, it is evident that a good man and a good citizen must have
the same object in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead
to rest are necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is
peace, of labour, rest; but those virtues whose object is rest, and
those also whose object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life
and rest; for we want a supply of many necessary things that we may be
at rest. A city therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient;
for, according to the proverb, "Rest is not for slaves;" but those who
cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of those who attack them.
Bravery, therefore, and patience are necessary for labour, philosophy
for rest, and temperance and justice in both; but these chiefly in
time of peace and rest; for war obliges men to be just and temperate;
but the enjoyment of pleasure, with the rest of peace, is more apt to
produce insolence; those indeed who are easy in their circumstances,
and enjoy everything that can make them happy, have great occasion for
the virtues of temperance and justice. Thus if there are, as the poets
tell us, any inhabitants in the happy isles, to these a higher degree
of philosophy, temperance, and justice will be necessary, as they live
at their ease in the full plenty of every sensual pleasure. It is
evident, therefore, that these virtues are necessary in every state
that would be happy or worthy; for he who is worthless can never enjoy
real good, much less is he qualified to be at rest; but can appear
good only by labour and being at war, but in peace and at rest the
meanest of creatures. For which reason virtue should not be cultivated
as the Lacedaemonians did; for they did not differ from others in
their opinion concerning the supreme good, but in [1334b] imagining
this good was to be procured by a particular virtue; but since there
are greater goods than those of war, it is evident that the enjoyment
of those which are valuable in themselves should be desired, rather
than those virtues which are useful in war; but how and by what means
this is to be acquired is now to be considered. We have already
assigned three causes on which it will depend; nature, custom, and
reason, arid shown what sort of men nature must produce for this
purpose; it remains then that we determine which we shall first begin
by in education, reason or custom, for these ought always to preserve
the most entire harmony with each other; for it may happen that reason
may err from the end proposed, and be corrected by custom. In the
first place, it is evident that in this as in other things, its
beginning or production arises from some principle, and its end also
arises from another principle, which is itself an end. Now, with us,
reason and intelligence are the end of nature; our production,
therefore, and our manners ought to be accommodated to both these. In
the next place, as the soul and the body are two distinct things, so
also we see that the soul is divided into two parts, the reasoning and
not-reasoning, with their habits which are two in number, one
belonging to each, namely appetite and intelligence; and as the body
is in production before the soul, so is the not-reasoning part of the
soul before the reasoning; and this is evident; for anger, will and
desire are to be seen in children nearly as soon as they are born; but
reason and intelligence spring up as they grow to maturity. The body,
therefore, necessarily demands our care before the soul; next the
appetites for the sake of the mind; the body for the sake of the soul. _

Read next: BOOK VII: CHAPTER XVI

Read previous: BOOK VII: CHAPTER XIV

Table of content of Treatise on Government


GO TO TOP OF SCREEN

Post your review
Your review will be placed after the table of content of this book