BOOK VI - CHAPTER IV

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_ There are four kinds of democracies. The best is that which is
composed of those first in order, as we have already said, and this
also is the most ancient of any. I call that the first which every one
would place so, was he to divide the people; for the best part of
these are the husbandmen. We see, then, that a democracy may be framed
where the majority live by tillage or pasturage; for, as their
property is but small, they will not be at leisure perpetually to hold
public assemblies, but will be continually employed in following their
own business, not having otherwise the means of living; nor will they
be desirous of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow
their own business than meddle with state affairs and accept the
offices of government, which will be attended with no great profit;
for the major part of mankind are rather desirous of riches than
honour (a proof of this is, that they submitted to the tyrannies in
ancient times, and do now submit to the oligarchies, if no one hinders
them in their usual occupations, or deprives them of their property;
for some of them soon get rich, others are removed from poverty);
besides, their having the right of election and calling their
magistrates to account for their conduct when they come out of office,
will satisfy their desire of honours, if any of them entertain that
passion: for in some states, though the commonalty have not the right
of electing the magistrates, yet it is vested in part of that body
chosen to represent them: and it is sufficient for the people at large
to possess the deliberative power: and this ought to be considered as
a species of democracy; such was that formerly at Mantinsea: for which
reason it is proper for the democracy we have been now treating of to
have a power (and it has been usual for them to have it) of censuring
their magistrates when out of office, and sitting in judgment upon all
causes: but that the chief magistrates should be elected, and
according to a certain census, which should vary with the rank of
their office, or else not by a census, but according to their
abilities for their respective appointments. A state thus constituted
must be well constituted; for the magistracies will be always filled
with the best men with the approbation of the people; who will not
envy their superiors: and these and the nobles should be content with
this part in the administration; for they will not be governed by
their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their power with
moderation, as there are others to whom full power is delegated to
censure their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the state to have
them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do whatsoever
they choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check to that
evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is [1319a] necessary
and most for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof should
be filled by the principal persons in it, whose characters are
unblemished, and that the people are not oppressed. It is now evident
that this is the best species of democracy, and on what account;
because the people are such and have such powers as they ought to
have. To establish a democracy of husbandmen some of those laws which
were observed in many ancient states are universally useful; as, for
instance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a
certain quantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city.
Formerly also, in some states, no one was allowed to sell their
original lot of land. They also mention a law of one Oxylus, which
forbade any one to add to their patrimony by usury. We ought also to
follow the law of the Aphutaeans, as useful to direct us in this
particular we are now speaking of; for they having but very little
ground, while they were a numerous people, and at the same time were
all husbandmen, did not include all their lands within the census, but
divided them in such a manner that, according to the census, the poor
had more power than the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is
one of shepherds and herdsmen; for they have many things in common
with them, and, by their way of life, are excellently qualified to
make good soldiers, stout in body, and able to continue in the open
air all night. The generality of the people of whom other democracies
are composed are much worse than these; for their lives are wretched
nor have they any business with virtue in anything they do; these are
your mechanics, your exchange-men, and hired servants; as all these
sorts of men frequent the exchange and the citadel, they can readily
attend the public assembly; whereas the husbandmen, being more
dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet together-nor are they
equally desirous of doing it with these others! When a country happens
to be so situated that a great part of the land lies at a distance
from the city, there it is easy to establish a good democracy or a
free state for the people in general will be obliged to live in the
country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy, though
there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal assembly
without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown in what
manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it
will be equally evident as to the rest, for from these we [1319b]
should proceed as a guide, and always separate the meanest of the
people from the rest. But the last and worst, which gives to every
citizen without distinction a share in every part of the
administration, is what few citizens can bear, nor is it easy to
preserve for any long time, unless well supported by laws and manners.
We have already noticed almost every cause that can destroy either
this or any other state. Those who have taken the lead in such a
democracy have endeavoured to support it, and make the people powerful
by collecting together as many persons as they could and giving them
their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally born, and also if
either of their parents were citizens, that is to say, if either their
father or mother; and this method is better suited to this state than
any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed. They ought,
however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common people
are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and then
stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the state
disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common
people, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of
an insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when
it becomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover,
very-useful in such a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he
was desirous of increasing the power of the people, and as those did
who established the democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many
tribes and fraternities, and to make the religious rites of private
persons few, and those common; and every means is to be contrived to
associate and blend the people together as much as possible; and that
all former customs be broken through. Moreover, whatsoever is
practised in a tyranny seems adapted to a democracy of this species;
as, for instance, the licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the
children; for this to a certain degree is useful in such a state; and
also to overlook every one's living as they choose; for many will
support such a government: for it is more agreeable to many to live
without any control than as prudence would direct. _

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