________________________________________________
_ It now remains that we speak of monarchies, their causes of
corruption, and means of preservation; and indeed almost the same
things which have been said of other governments happen to kingdoms
and tyrannies; for a kingdom partakes of an aristocracy, a tyranny of
the worst species of an oligarchy and democracy; for which reason it
is the worst that man can submit to, as being composed of two, both of
which are bad, and collectively retains all the corruptions and all
the defects of both these states. These two species of monarchies
arise from principles contrary to each other: a kingdom is formed to
protect the better sort of people against the multitude, and kings are
appointed out of those, who are chosen either for their superior
virtue and actions flowing from virtuous principles, or else from
their noble descent; but a tyrant is chosen out of the meanest
populace; an enemy to the better sort, that the common people may not
be oppressed by them. That this is true experience convinces us; for
the generality of tyrants were indeed mere demagogues, who gained
credit with the people by oppressing the nobles. Some tyrannies were
established in this manner after the cities were considerably
enlarged--others before that time, by kings who exceeded the power
which their country allowed them, from a desire of governing
despotically: others were founded by those who were elected to the
superior offices in the state; for formerly the people appointed
officers for life, who came to be at the head of civil and religious
affairs, and these chose one out of their body in whom the supreme
power over all the magistrates was placed. By all these means it was
easy to establish a tyranny, if they chose it; for their power was
ready at hand, either by their being kings, or else by enjoying the
honours of the state; thus Phidon at Argos and other tyrants enjoyed
originally the kingly power; Phalaris and others in Ionia, the honours
of the state. Pansetius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus
at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others, acquired theirs by
having been demagogues. A kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of
the nature of an aristocracy, and is bestowed according to worth, as
either virtue, family, beneficent actions, or these joined with power;
for those who have been benefactors to cities and states, or have it
in their powers to be so, have acquired this honour, and those who
have prevented a people from falling into slavery by war, as Codrus,
or those who have freed them from it, as Cyrus, or the founders of
cities, or settlers of colonies, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and
Molossus. A king desires to be the guardian of his people, that those
who have property may be secure in the possession of it, and that the
people in general meet with no injury; but a tyrant, as has been often
said, has no regard to the common good, except for his own advantage;
his only object is pleasure, but a king's is virtue: what a tyrant
therefore is ambitious of engrossing is wealth, but a king rather
honour. The guards too of a king are citizens, a tyrant's foreigners.
That a tyranny contains all that is bad both in a democracy and an
oligarchy is evident; with an oligarchy it has for its end gain, as
the only means of providing the tyrant with guards and the luxuries of
life; like that it places no confidence in the people; and therefore
deprives them of the use of arms: it is also common to them both to
persecute the populace, to drive them out of the city and their own
habitations. With a democracy it quarrels with the nobles, and
destroys them both publicly and privately, or drives them into
banishment, as rivals and an impediment to the government; hence
naturally arise conspiracies both amongst those who desire to govern
and those who desire not to be slaves; hence arose Periander's advice
to Thrasybulus to take off the tallest stalks, hinting thereby, that
it was necessary to make away with the eminent citizens. We ought then
in reason, as has been already said, to account for the changes which
arise in a monarchy from the same causes which produce them in other
states: for, through injustice received, fear, and contempt, many of
those who are under a monarchical government conspire against it; but
of all species of injustice, injurious contempt has most influence on
them for that purpose: sometimes it is owing to their being deprived
of their private fortunes. The dissolution too of a kingdom and a
tyranny are generally the same; for monarchs abound in wealth and
honour, which all are desirous to obtain. Of plots: some aim at the
life of those who govern, others at their government; the first arises
from hatred to their persons; which hatred may be owing to many
causes, either of which will be sufficient to excite their anger, and
the generality of those who are under the influence of that passion
will join in a conspiracy, not for the sake of their own advancement,
but for revenge. Thus the plot against the children of Pisistratus
arose from their injurious treatment of Harmodius's sister, and
insulting him also; for Harmodius resenting the injury done to his
sister, and Aristogiton the injury done to Harmodius. Periander the
tyrant of Ambracia also lost his life by a conspiracy, for some
improper liberties he took with a boy in his cups: and Philip was
slain by Pausanias for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had
received from Attains; as was Amintas the Little by Darda, for
insulting him on account of his age; and the eunuch by Evagoras the
Cyprian in revenge for having taken his son's wife away from him ....
Many also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes have,
through resentment, either killed those who caused them to be
inflicted or conspired against them, even when they had kingly power,
as at Mitylene Megacles, joining with his friends, killed the
Penthelidee, who used to go about striking those they met with clubs.
Thus, in later times, Smendes killed Penthilus for whipping him and
dragging him away from his wife. Decamnichus also was the chief cause
of the conspiracy against Archelaus, for he urged others on: the
occasion of his resentment was his having delivered him to Euripides
the poet to be scourged; for Euripides was greatly offended with him
for having said something of the foulness of his breath. And many
others have been killed or conspired against on the same account. Fear
too is a cause which produces the same effects, as well in monarchies
as in other states: thus Artabanes conspired against Xerxes through
fear of punishment for having hanged Darius according to his orders,
whom he supposed he intended to pardon, as the order was given at
supper-time. Some kings also have been [1312a] dethroned and killed in
consequence of the contempt they were held in by the people; as some
one conspired against Sardanapalus, having seen him spinning with his
wife, if what is related of him is true, or if not of him, it may very
probably be true of some one else. Dion also conspired against
Dionysius the Younger, seeing his subjects desirous of a conspiracy,
and that he himself was always drunk: and even a man's friends will do
this if they despise him; for from the confidence he places in them,
they think that they shall not be found out. Those also who think they
shall gain his throne will conspire against a king through contempt;
for as they are powerful themselves, and despise the danger, on
account of their own strength, they will readily attempt it. Thus a
general at the head of his army will endeavour to dethrone the
monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, despising both his manner of life and
his forces; his forces for want of action, his life for its
effeminacy: thus Suthes, the Thracian, who was general to Amadocus,
conspired against him. Sometimes more than one of these causes will
excite men to enter into conspiracies, as contempt and desire of gain;
as in the instance of Mithridates against Ariobarzanes. Those also who
are of a bold disposition, and have gained military honours amongst
kings, will of all others be most like to engage in sedition; for
strength and courage united inspire great bravery: whenever,
therefore, these join in one person, he will be very ready for
conspiracies, as he will easily conquer. Those who conspire against a
tyrant through love of glory and honour have a different motive in
view from what I have already mentioned; for, like all others who
embrace danger, they have only glory and honour in view, and think,
not as some do, of the wealth and pomp they may acquire, but engage in
this as they would in any other noble action, that they may be
illustrious and distinguished, and destroy a tyrant, not to succeed in
his tyranny, but to acquire renown. No doubt but the number of those
who act upon this principle is small, for we must suppose they regard
their own safety as nothing in case they should not succeed, and must
embrace the opinion of Dion (which few can do) when he made war upon
Dionysius with a very few troops; for he said, that let the advantage
he made be ever so little it would satisfy him to have gained it; and
that, should it be his lot to die the moment he had gained footing in
his country, he should think his death sufficiently glorious. A
tyranny also is exposed to the same destruction as all other states
are, from too powerful neighbours: for it is evident, that an
opposition of principles will make them desirous of subverting it; and
what they desire, all who can, do: and there is a principle of
opposition in one state to another, as a democracy against a tyranny,
as says Hesiod, "a potter against a potter;" for the extreme of a
democracy is a tyranny; a kingly power against an aristocracy, from
their different forms of government--for which reason the
Lacedaemonians destroyed many tyrannies; as did the Syracusians during
the prosperity of their state. Nor are they only destroyed from
without, but also from within, when those who have no share in the
power bring about a revolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to
Dionysius; to the first, by means of Thrasybulus, the brother of
Hiero, who nattered Gelon's son, and induced him to lead a life of
pleasure, that he himself might govern; but the family joined together
and endeavoured to support the tyranny and expel Thrasybulus; but
those whom they made of their party seized the opportunity and
expelled the whole family. Dion made war against his relation
Dionysius, and being assisted by the people, first expelled and then
killed him. As there are two causes which chiefly induce men to
conspire against tyrants, hatred and contempt, one of these, namely
hatred, seems inseparable from them. Contempt also is often the cause
of their destruction: for though, for instance, those who raised
themselves to the supreme power generally preserved it; but those who
received it from them have, to speak truth, almost immediately all of
them lost it; for, falling into an effeminate way of life, they soon
grew despicable, and generally fell victims to conspiracies. Part of
their hatred may be very fitly ascribed to anger; for in some cases
this is their motive to action: for it is often a cause which impels
them to act more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater
obstinacy against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under
the direction of reason. Many persons also indulge this passion
through contempt; which occasioned the fall of the Pisistratidae and
many others. But hatred is more powerful than anger; for anger is
accompanied with grief, which prevents the entrance of reason; but
hatred is free from it. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as
the destruction of a pure oligarchy unmixed with any other government
and an extreme democracy, the same may be applied to a tyranny; for
these are divided tyrannies.
Kingdoms are seldom destroyed by any outward attack; for which reason
they are generally very stable; but they have many causes of
subversion within; of which two are the principal; one is when those
who are in power [1313a] excite a sedition, the other when they
endeavour to establish a tyranny by assuming greater power than the
law gives them. A kingdom, indeed, is not what we ever see erected in
our times, but rather monarchies and tyrannies; for a kingly
government is one that is voluntarily submitted to, and its supreme
power admitted upon great occasions: but where many are equal, and
there are none in any respect so much better than another as to be
qualified for the greatness and dignity of government over them, then
these equals will not willingly submit to be commanded; but if any one
assumes the government, either by force or fraud, this is a tyranny.
To what we have already said we shall add, the causes of revolutions
in an hereditary kingdom. One of these is, that many of those who
enjoy it are naturally proper objects of contempt only: another is,
that they are insolent while their power is not despotic; but they
possess kingly honours only. Such a state is soon destroyed; for a
king exists but while the people are willing to obey, as their
submission to him is voluntary, but to a tyrant involuntary. These and
such-like are the causes of the destruction of monarchies. _
Read next: BOOK V: CHAPTER XI
Read previous: BOOK V: CHAPTER IX
Table of content of Treatise on Government
GO TO TOP OF SCREEN
Post your review
Your review will be placed after the table of content of this book
