BOOK V - CHAPTER VI

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_ There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a
revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for
then every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly
if one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis,
at Naxus, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also
which arise from different causes will differ from each other; for
sometimes a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share
in the administration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and
this happened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for
those who had no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes
till they were admitted to it: first the elder brothers, and then the
younger also: for in some places the father and son are never in
office at the same time; in others the elder and younger brother: and
where this is observed the oligarchy partakes something of a free
state. At Ister it was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead
of being in the hands of a few, it consisted of six hundred. At Cnidus
the oligarchy was destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with each other,
because the government was in the hands of so few: for there, as we
have just mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not;
or, if there were many brothers, the eldest only; for the people,
taking advantage of their disputes, elected one of the nobles for
their general, and got the victory: for where there are seditions
government is weak. And formerly at Erithria, during the oligarchy of
the Basilides, although the state flourished greatly under their
excellent management, yet because the people were displeased that the
power should be in the hands of so few, they changed the government.
Oligarchies also are subject to revolutions, from those who are in
office therein, from the quarrels of the demagogues with each other.
The demagogues are of two sorts; one who flatter the few when they are
in power: for even these have their demagogues; such was Charicles at
Athens, who had great influence over the thirty; and, in the same
manner, Phrynichus over the four hundred. The others are those
demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy, and flatter the people:
such were the state-guardians at Larissa, who flattered the people
because they were elected by them. And this will always happen in
every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect themselves, but are
chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain ranks, by the
soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos. And when the
judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme power, the
demagogues, favouring the people in their causes, overturn the
government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and also when some
desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for
those who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply to the
people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions
when the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are
desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves
or to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported
Dionysius of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a
colony of Chal-cidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with
the rich: and at AEgina a certain person who brought an action against
Chares attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes
they will try to raise commotions, sometimes they will rob the public,
and then quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who
endeavour to detect them; which was the case at Apollonia in Pontus.
But if the members of an oligarchy agree among themselves the state is
not very easily destroyed without some external force. Pharsalus is a
proof of this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have
great power, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy also
will be destroyed when they create another oligarchy under it; that
is, when the management of public affairs is in the hands of a few,
and not equally, but when all of them do not partake of the supreme
power, as happened once at Elis, where the supreme power in general
was in the hands of a very few out of whom a senate was chosen,
consisting but of ninety' who held their places for life; and their
mode of election was calculated to preserve the power amongst each
other's families, like the senators at Lacedaemon. An oligarchy is
liable to a revolution both in time of war and peace; in war, because
through a distrust in the citizens the government is obliged to employ
mercenary troops, and he to whom they give the command of the army
will very often assume the tyranny, as Timophanes did at Corinth; and
if they appoint more than one general, they will very probably
establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear of this, they are
forced to let the people in general have some share in the government,
because they are obliged to employ them. In peace, from their want of
confidence in each other, they will entrust the guardianship of the
state to mercenaries and their general, who will be an arbiter between
them, and sometimes become master of both, which happened at Larissa,
when Simos and the Aleuadae had the chief power. The same thing
happened at Abydos, during the time of the political clubs, of which
Iphiades' was one. Commotions also will happen in an oligarchy from
one party's overbearing and insulting another, or from their
quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their marriages,
for instance, will have that effect has been already shown: and in
Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the same
account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person
being condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's
being guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion
suffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was
that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have
them publicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions also have been
brought about in oligarchies by those who could not brook the
despotism which those persons assumed who were in power, as at Cnidus
and Chios. Changes also may happen by accident in what we call a free
state and in an oligarchy; wheresoever the senators, judges, and
magistrates are chosen according to a certain census; for it often
happens that the highest census is fixed at first; so that a few only
could have a share in the government, in an oligarchy, or in a free
state those of moderate fortunes only; when the city grows rich,
through peace or some other happy cause, it becomes so little that
every one's fortune is equal to the census, so that the whole
community may partake of all the honours of government; and this
change sometimes happens by little and little, and insensible
approaches, sometimes quicker. These are the revolutions and seditions
that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they are owing: and
indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter, not into
governments of a contrary form, but into those of the same government;
as, for instance, from having the supreme power in the law to vest it
in the ruling party, or the contrariwise. _

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