BOOK V - CHAPTER I

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_ We have now gone through those particulars we proposed to speak of; it
remains that we next consider from what causes and how alterations in
government arise, and of what nature they are, and to what the
destruction of each state is owing; and also to what form any form of
polity is most likely to shift into, and what are the means to be used
for the general preservation of governments, as well as what are
applicable to any particular state; and also of the remedies which are
to be applied either to all in general, or to any one considered
separately, when they are in a state of corruption: and here we ought
first to lay down this principle, that there are many governments, all
of which approve of what is just and what is analogically equal; and
yet have failed from attaining thereunto, as we have already
mentioned; thus democracies have arisen from supposing that those who
are equal in one thing are so in every other circumstance; as, because
they are equal in liberty, they are equal in everything else; and
oligarchies, from supposing that those who are unequal in one thing
are unequal in all; that when men are so in point of fortune, that
inequality extends to everything else. Hence it follows, that those
who in some respects are equal with others think it right to endeavour
to partake of an equality with them in everything; and those who are
superior to others endeavour to get still more; and it is this more
which is the inequality: thus most states, though they have some
notion of what is just, yet are almost totally wrong; and, upon this
account, when either party has not that share in the administration
which answers to his expectations, he becomes seditious: but those who
of all others have the greatest right to be so are the last that are;
namely, those who excel in virtue; for they alone can be called
generally superior. There are, too, some persons of distinguished
families who, because they are so, disdain to be on an equality with
others, for those esteem themselves noble who boast of their
ancestors' merit and fortune: these, to speak truth, are the origin
and fountain from whence seditions arise. The alterations which men
may propose to make in governments are two; for either they may change
the state already established into some other, as when they propose to
erect an oligarchy where there is a democracy; or a democracy, or free
state, where there is an oligarchy, or an aristocracy from these, or
those from that; or else, when they have no objection to the
established government, which they like very well, but choose to have
the sole management in it themselves; either in the hands of a few or
one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the degree in
which they would have the established power; as if, for instance, the
government is an oligarchy, to have it more purely so, and in the same
manner if it is a democracy, or else to have it less so; and, in like
manner, whatever may be the nature of the government, either to extend
or contract its powers; or else to make some alterations in some parts
of it; as to establish or abolish a particular magistracy, as some
persons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in
Sparta; and Pausanias that of the ephori. Thus in Epidamnus there was
an alteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the
philarchi they established a senate. It is also necessary for all the
magistrates at Athens; to attend in the court of the Helisea when any
new magistrate is created: the power of the archon also in that state
partakes of the nature of an oligarchy: inequality is always the
occasion of sedition, but not when those who are unequal are treated
in a different manner correspondent to that inequality. Thus kingly
power is unequal when exercised over equals. Upon the whole, those who
aim after an equality are the cause of seditions. Equality is twofold,
either in number or value. Equality in number is when two things
contain the same parts or the same quantity; equality in value is by
proportion as two exceeds one, and three two by the same number-thus
by proportion four exceeds two, and two one in the same degree, for
two is the same part of four that one is of two; that is to say, half.
Now, all agree in what is absolutely and simply just; but, as we have
already said they dispute concerning proportionate value; for some
persons, if they are equal in one respect, think themselves equal in
all; others, if they are superior in one thing, think they may claim
the superiority in all; from whence chiefly arise two sorts of
governments, a democracy and an oligarchy; for nobility and virtue are
to be found only [1302a] amongst a few; the contrary amongst the many;
there being in no place a hundred of the first to be met with, but
enough of the last everywhere. But to establish a government entirely
upon either of these equalities is wrong, and this the example of
those so established makes evident, for none of them have been stable;
and for this reason, that it is impossible that whatever is wrong at
the first and in its principles should not at last meet with a bad
end: for which reason in some things an equality of numbers ought to
take place, in others an equality in value. However, a democracy is
safer and less liable to sedition than an oligarchy; for in this
latter it may arise from two causes, for either the few in power may
conspire against each other or against the people; but in a democracy
only one; namely, against the few who aim at exclusive power; but
there is no instance worth speaking of, of a sedition of the people
against themselves. Moreover, a government composed of men of moderate
fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy than an oligarchy, and is
the safest of all such states. _

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