________________________________________________
_ We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates; for this branch
of public business contains many different Parts, as how many there
shall be, what shall be their particular office, and with respect to
time how long each of them shall continue in place; for some make it
six months, others shorter, others for a year, others for a much
longer time; or whether they should be perpetual or for a long time,
or neither; for the same person may fill the same office several
times, or he may not be allowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once:
and also with respect to the appointment of magistrates, who are to be
eligible, who is to choose them, and in what manner; for in all these
particulars we ought properly to distinguish the different ways which
may be followed; and then to show which of these is best suited to
such and such governments.
Now it is not easy to determine to whom we ought properly to give the
name of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in office;
but every one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to
be reckoned a magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first
place; for these are to be considered as very different from civil
magistrates: to these we may add the choregi and heralds; nay, even
ambassadors are elected: there are some civil employments which belong
to the citizens; and these are either when they are all engaged in one
thing, as when as soldiers they obey their general, or when part of
them only are, as in governing the women or educating the youth; and
also some economic, for they often elect corn-meters: others are
servile, and in which, if they are rich, they employ slaves. But
indeed they are most properly called magistrates, who are members of
the deliberative council, or decide causes, or are in some command,
the last more especially, for to command is peculiar to magistrates.
But to speak truth, this question is of no great consequence, nor is
it the province of the judges to decide between those who dispute
about words; it may indeed be an object of speculative inquiry; but to
inquire what officers are necessary in a state, and how many, and
what, though not most necessary, may yet be advantageous in a
well-established government, is a much more useful employment, and
this with respect to all states in general, as well as to small
cities.
In extensive governments it is proper to allot one employment to one
person, as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a
society, where some may be passed over for a long time, and others
never be in office but once; and indeed everything is better done
which has the whole attention of one person, than when that [1299b]
attention is divided amongst many; but in small states it is necessary
that a few of the citizens should execute many employments; for their
numbers are so small it will not be convenient to have many of them in
office at the same time; for where shall we find others to succeed
them in turn? Small states will sometimes want the same magistrates
and the same laws as large ones; but the one will not want to employ
them so often as the other; so that different charges may be intrusted
to the same person without any inconvenience, for they will not
interfere with each other, and for want of sufficient members in the
community it will be necessary. If we could tell how many magistrates
are necessary in every city, and how many, though not necessary, it is
yet proper to have, we could then the better know how many different
offices one might assign to one magistrate. It is also necessary to
know what tribunals in different places should have different things
under their jurisdiction, and also what things should always come
under the cognisance of the same magistrate; as, for instance, decency
of manners, shall the clerk of the market take cognisance of that if
the cause arises in the market, and another magistrate in another
place, or the same magistrate everywhere: or shall there be a
distinction made of the fact, or the parties? as, for instance, in
decency of manners, shall it be one cause when it relates to a man,
another when it relates to a woman?
In different states shall the magistrates be different or the same? I
mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a
monarchy, the same persons shall have the same power? or shall it vary
according to the different formation of the government? as in an
aristocracy the offices of the state are allotted to those who are
well educated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy
to the freemen? Or shall the magistrates differ as the communities
differ? For it may happen that the very same may be sometimes proper,
sometimes otherwise: in this state it may be necessary that the
magistrate have great powers, in that but small. There are also
certain magistrates peculiar to certain states--as the pre-advisers
are not proper in a democracy, but a senate is; for one such order is
necessary, whose business shall be to consider beforehand and prepare
those bills which shall be brought before the people that they may
have leisure to attend to their own affairs; and when these are few in
number the state inclines to an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed
must always be few for they are peculiar to an oligarchy: and where
there are both these offices in the same state, the pre-adviser's is
superior to the senator's, the one having only a democratical power,
the other an oligarchical: and indeed the [1300a] power of the senate
is lost in those democracies, in which the people, meeting in one
public assembly, take all the business into their own hands; and this
is likely to happen either when the community in general are in easy
circumstances, or when they are paid for their attendance; for they
are then at leisure often to meet together and determine everything
for themselves. A magistrate whose business is to control the manners
of the boys, or women, or who takes any department similar to this, is
to be found in an aristocracy, not in a democracy; for who can forbid
the wives of the poor from appearing in public? neither is such a one
to be met with in an oligarchy; for the women there are too delicate
to bear control. And thus much for this subject. Let us endeavour to
treat at large of the establishment of magistrates, beginning from
first principles. Now, they differ from each other in three ways, from
which, blended together, all the varieties which can be imagined
arise. The first of these differences is in those who appoint the
magistrates, the second consists in those who are appointed, the third
in the mode of appointment; and each of these three differ in three
manners; for either all the citizens may appoint collectively, or some
out of their whole body, or some out of a particular order in it,
according to fortune, family, or virtue, or some other rule (as at
Megara, where the right of election was amongst those who had returned
together to their country, and had reinstated themselves by force of
arms) and this either by vote or lot. Again, these several modes may
be differently formed together, as some magistrates may be chosen by
part of the community, others by the whole; some out of part, others
out of the whole; some by vote, others by lot: and each of these
different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision; for either all may
elect all by vote or by lot; and when all elect, they may either
proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain
division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through
the whole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and
others another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote
or lot of all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of
some, or some one way and some another; that is to say, some by the
vote of all, others by the lot of all, there will then be twelve
different methods of electing the magistrates, without blending the
two together. Of these there are two adapted to a democracy; namely,
to have all the magistrates chosen out of all the people, either by
vote or lot, or both; that is to say, some of them by lot, some by
vote. In a free state the whole community should not elect at the same
time, but some out of the whole, or out of some particular rank; and
this either by lot, or vote, or both: and they should elect either out
of the whole community, or out of some particular persons in it, and
this both by lot and vote. In an oligarchy it is proper to choose some
magistrates out of the whole body of the citizens, some by vote, some
by lot, others by both: by lot is most correspondent to that form of
government. In a free aristocracy, some magistrates [1300b] should be
chosen out of the community in general, others out of a particular
rank, or these by choice, those by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the
magistrates should be chosen out of certain ranks, and by certain
persons, and some of those by lot, others by both methods; but to
choose them out of the whole community is not correspondent to the
nature of this government. It is proper in an aristocracy for the
whole community to elect their magistrates out of particular persons,
and this by vote. These then are all the different ways of electing of
magistrates; and they have been allotted according to the nature of
the different communities; but what mode of proceeding is proper for
different communities, or how the offices ought to be established, or
with what powers shall be particularly explained. I mean by the powers
of a magistrate, what should be his particular province, as the
management of the finances or the laws of the state; for different
magistrates have different powers, as that of the general of the army
differs from the clerk of the market. _
Read next: BOOK IV: CHAPTER XVI
Read previous: BOOK IV: CHAPTER XIV
Table of content of Treatise on Government
GO TO TOP OF SCREEN
Post your review
Your review will be placed after the table of content of this book
