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_ We will now proceed to make some general reflections upon the
governments next in order, and also to consider each of them in
particular; beginning with those principles which appertain to each:
now there are three things in all states which a careful legislator
ought well to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and
which properly attended to the state must necessarily be happy; and
according to the variation of which the one will differ from the
other. The first of these is the [1298a] public assembly; the second
the officers of the state, that is, who they ought to be, and with
what power they should be entrusted, and in what manner they should be
appointed; the third, the judicial department.
Now it is the proper business of the public assembly to determine
concerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact
laws, to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and
to call the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office.
Now these powers must necessarily be entrusted to the citizens in
general, or all of them to some; either to one magistrate or more; or
some to one, and some to another, or some to all, but others to some:
to entrust all to all is in the spirit of a democracy, for the people
aim at equality. There are many methods of delegating these powers to
the citizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them by
turn, and not altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the Milesian, in
his state. In others the supreme council is composed of the different
magistrates, and they succeed to the offices of the community by
proper divisions of tribes, wards, and other very small proportions,
till every one in his turn goes through them: nor does the whole
community ever meet together, without it is when new laws are enacted,
or some national affair is debated, or to hear what the magistrates
have to propose to them. Another method is for the people to meet in a
collective body, but only for the purpose of holding the comitia,
making laws, determining concerning war or peace, and inquiring into
the conduct of their magistrates, while the remaining part of the
public business is conducted by the magistrates, who have their
separate departments, and are chosen out of the whole community either
by vote or ballot. Another method is for the people in general to meet
for the choice of the magistrates, and to examine into their conduct;
and also to deliberate concerning war and alliances, and to leave
other things to the magistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, whose
particular employments are such as necessarily require persons well
skilled therein. A fourth method is for every person to deliberate
upon every subject in public assembly, where the magistrates can
determine nothing of themselves, and have only the privilege of giving
their opinions first; and this is the method of the most pure
democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings in a dynastic
oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy.
These, then, are the methods in which public business is conducted in
a democracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the community
only, it is an oligarchy and this also admits of different customs;
for whenever the officers of the state are chosen out of those who
have a moderate fortune, and these from that circumstance are many,
and when they depart not from that line which the law has laid down,
but carefully follow it, and when all within the census are eligible,
certainly it is then an oligarchy, but founded on true principles of
government [1298b] from its moderation. When the people in general do
not partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for
that purpose, who govern according to law; this also, like the first,
is an oligarchy. When those who have the deliberative power elect each
other, and the son succeeds to the father, and when they can supersede
the laws, such a government is of necessity a strict oligarchy. When
some persons determine on one thing, and others on another, as war and
peace, and when all inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, and
other things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or
lot, then the government is an aristocracy or a free state. When some
are chosen by vote and others by lot, and these either from the people
in general, or from a certain number elected for that purpose, or if
both the votes and the lots are open to all, such a state is partly an
aristocracy, partly a free government itself. These are the different
methods in which the deliberative power is vested in different states,
all of whom follow some regulation here laid down. It is advantageous
to a democracy, in the present sense of the word, by which I mean a
state wherein the people at large have a supreme power, even over the
laws, to hold frequent public assemblies; and it will be best in this
particular to imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of
justice; for they fine those who are appointed to try causes if they
do not attend, so should they reward the poor for coming to the public
assemblies: and their counsels will be best when all advise with each
other, the citizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It
is also advisable when the council is to be composed of part of the
citizens, to elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both
ranks. It is also proper, if the common people in the state are very
numerous, either not to pay every one for his attendance, but such a
number only as will make them equal to the nobles, or to reject many
of them by lot.
In an oligarchy they should either call up some of the common people
to the council, or else establish a court, as is done in some other
states, whom they call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose
business should be to propose first what they should afterwards enact.
By this means the people would have a place in the administration of
public affairs, without having it in their power to occasion any
disorder in the government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to
have a vote in whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves
propose anything contrary thereto; or they may give their advice,
while the power of determining may be with the magistrates only. It is
also necessary to follow a contrary practice to what is established in
democracies, for the people should be allowed the power of pardoning,
but not of condemning, for the cause should be referred back again to
the magistrates: whereas the contrary takes place in republics; for
the power of pardoning is with the few, but not of condemning, which
is always referred [1299a] to the people at large. And thus we
determine concerning the deliberative power in any state, and in whose
hands it shall be. _
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