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_ There are five particulars in which, under fair pretences, the rich
craftily endeavour to undermine the rights of the people, these are
their public assemblies, their offices of state, their courts of
justice, their military power, and their gymnastic exercises. With
respect to their public assemblies, in having them open to all, but in
fining the rich only, or others very little, for not attending; with
respect to offices, in permitting the poor to swear off, but not
granting this indulgence to those who are within the census; with
respect to their courts of justice, in fining the rich for
non-attendance, but the poor not at all, or those a great deal, and
these very little, as was done by the laws of Charondas. In some
places every citizen who was enrolled had a right to attend the public
assemblies and to try causes; which if they did not do, a very heavy
fine was laid upon them; that through fear of the fine they might
avoid being enrolled, as they were then obliged to do neither the one
nor the other. The same spirit of legislation prevailed with respect
to their bearing arms and their gymnastic exercises; for the poor are
excused if they have no arms, but the rich are fined; the same method
takes place if they do not attend their gymnastic exercises, there is
no penalty on one, but there is on the other: the consequence of which
is, that the fear of this penalty induces the rich to keep the one and
attend the other, while the poor do neither. These are the deceitful
contrivances of oligarchical legislators.
The contrary prevails in a democracy; for there they make the poor a
proper allowance for attending the assemblies and the courts, but give
the rich nothing for doing it: whence it is evident, that if any one
would properly blend these customs together, they must extend both the
pay and the fine to every member of the community, and then every one
would share in it, whereas part only now do. The citizens of a free
state ought to [1297b] consist of those only who bear arms: with
respect to their census it is not easy to determine exactly what it
ought to be, but the rule that should direct upon this subject should
be to make it as extensive as possible, so that those who are enrolled
in it make up a greater part of the people than those who are not; for
those who are poor, although they partake not of the offices of the
state, are willing to live quiet, provided that no one disturbs them
in their property: but this is not an easy matter; for it may not
always happen, that those who are at the head of public affairs are of
a humane behaviour. In time of war the poor are accustomed to show no
alacrity without they have provisions found them; when they have, then
indeed they are willing to fight.
In some governments the power is vested not only in those who bear
arms, but also in those who have borne them. Among the Malienses the
state was composed of these latter only, for all the officers were
soldiers who had served their time. And the first states in Greece
which succeeded those where kingly power was established, were
governed by the military. First of all the horse, for at that time the
strength and excellence of the army depended on the horse, for as to
the heavy-armed foot they were useless without proper discipline; but
the art of tactics was not known to the ancients, for which reason
their strength lay in their horse: but when cities grew larger, and
they depended more on their foot, greater numbers partook of the
freedom of the city; for which reason what we call republics were
formerly called democracies. The ancient governments were properly
oligarchies or kingdoms; for on account of the few persons in each
state, it would have been impossible to have found a sufficient number
of the middle rank; so these being but few, and those used to
subordination, they more easily submitted to be governed.
We have now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and others
different from those we have treated of: for there are more species of
democracies than one, and the like is true of other forms, and what
are their differences, and whence they arise; and also of all others
which is the best, at least in general; and which is best suited for
particular people. _
Read next: BOOK IV: CHAPTER XIV
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