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_ It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a state, that all,
or at least many of these particulars should be well canvassed and
inquired into; and that virtue and education may most justly claim the
right of being considered as the necessary means of making the
citizens happy, as we have already said. As those who are equal in one
particular are not therefore equal in all, and those who are unequal
in one particular are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that
all those governments which are established upon a principle which
supposes they are, are erroneous.
We have already said, that all the members of the community will
dispute with each other for the offices of the state; and in some
particulars justly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance,
because they have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right
to the soil is vested in the community; and also because their
fidelity is in general most to be depended on. The freemen and men of
family will dispute the point with each other, as nearly on an
equality; for these latter have a right to a higher regard as citizens
than obscure persons, for honourable descent is everywhere of great
esteem: nor is it an improper conclusion, that the descendants of men
of worth will be men of worth themselves; for noble birth is the
fountain of virtue to men of family: for the same reason also we
justly say, that virtue has a right to put in her pretensions.
Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary to society, that
all others must yield her the precedence.
Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the
few; and they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are
compared with them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they
are. But should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the
[1283b] same city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as
the many, such as usually make up the community, I ask, will there
then be any reason to dispute concerning who shall govern, or will
there not? for in every community which we have mentioned there is no
dispute where the supreme power should be placed; for as these differ
from each other, so do those in whom that is placed; for in one state
the rich enjoy it, in others the meritorious, and thus each according
to their separate manners. Let us however consider what is to be done
when all these happen at the same time to inhabit the same city. If
the virtuous should be very few in number, how then shall we act?
shall we prefer the virtuous on account of their abilities, if they
are capable of governing the city? or should they be so many as almost
entirely to compose the state?
There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who
claim the honours of government: for those who found them either on
fortune or family have nothing which they can justly say in their
defence; since it is evident upon their principle, that if any one
person can be found richer than all the rest, the right of governing
all these will be justly vested in this one person. In the same
manner, one man who is of the best family will claim it from those who
dispute the point upon family merit: and probably in an aristocracy
the same dispute might arise on the score of virtue, if there is one
man better than all the other men of worth who are in the same
community; it seems just, by the same reasoning, that he should enjoy
the supreme power. And upon this principle also, while the many
suppose they ought to have the supreme command, as being more powerful
than the few, if one or more than one, though a small number should be
found stronger than themselves, these ought rather to have it than
they.
All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles
are justly founded on which these persons would establish their right
to the supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them:
for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their
fortune, they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing
hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better
or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective
capacity.
As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may
answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would
establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for
the use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the
circumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything
consists in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will
be advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in
common.
Now, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government
and also in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition,
it is true, is different in different states: the best is that in
which a man is enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of
virtue during his whole life, both in his public and private state.
But should there be one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon
degree of virtue, though not enough to make up a civil state, so that
the virtue of the many, or their political abilities, should be too
inferior to come in comparison with theirs, if more than one; or if
but one, with his only; such are not to be considered as part of the
city; for it would be doing them injustice to rate them on a level
with those who are so far their inferiors in virtue and political
abilities, that they appear to them like a god amongst men. From
whence it is evident, that a system of laws must be calculated for
those who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such men,
therefore, are not the object of law; for they are themselves a law:
and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to include them in
the penalties of a law: for probably they might say what Antisthenes
tells us the lions did to the hares when they demanded to be admitted
to an equal share with them in the government. And it is on this
account that democratic states have established the ostracism; for an
equality seems the principal object of their government. For which
reason they compel all those who are very eminent for their power,
their fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give
them too great weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism,
and leave the city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate
the Argonauts served Hercules, for they refused to take him with them
in the ship Argo on account of his superior valour. For which reason
those who hate a tyranny and find fault with the advice which
Periander gave to Thrasybulus, must not think there was nothing to be
said in its defence; for the story goes, that Periander said nothing
to the messenger in answer to the business he was consulted about, but
striking off those ears of corn which were higher than the rest,
reduced the whole crop to a level; so that the messenger, without
knowing the cause of what was done, related the fact to Thrasybulus,
who understood by it that he must take off all the principal men in
the city. Nor is this serviceable to tyrants only; nor is it tyrants
only who do it; for the same thing is practised both in oligarchies
and democracies: for the ostracism has in a manner nearly the same
power, by restraining and banishing those who are too great; and what
is done in one city is done also by those who have the supreme power
in separate states; as the Athenians with respect to the Samians, the
Chians, and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly acquired the
superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states into
subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them. The
King of Persia also very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians when
they assume upon their former power: [1284b] and this is a principle
which all governments whatsoever keep in their eye; even those which
are best administered, as well as those which are not, do it; these
for the sake of private utility, the others for the public good.
The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for
a painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally
large, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the
shipwright make the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than
it ought to be; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings
louder and better than the rest to sing in concert with them. There is
therefore no reason that a monarch should not act in agreement with
free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for
the benefit of their respective communities; upon which account when
there is any acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the
reason upon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just;
but it is better for the legislator so to establish his state at the
beginning as not to want this remedy: but if in course of time such an
inconvenience should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such
correction. Not that this was the use it was put to: for many did not
regard the benefit of their respective communities, but made the
ostracism a weapon in the hand of sedition.
It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and
useful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is
not entirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great
doubts about the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which
one may have in strength, riches, or connection: but when the
pre-eminence is virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not
right to turn out and banish such a one; neither does it seem right to
govern him, for that would be like desiring to share the power with
Jupiter and to govern him: nothing then remains but what indeed seems
natural, and that is for all persons quietly to submit to the
government of those who are thus eminently virtuous, and let them be
perpetually kings in the separate states. _
Read next: BOOK III: CHAPTER XIV
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