BOOK III - CHAPTER XII

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_ Since in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, so
particularly in this, which is the most excellent of all, the founding
of civil society, the good wherein aimed at is justice; for it is this
which is for the benefit of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that
justice is a certain equality; and in this point all the philosophers
are agreed when they treat of morals: for they say what is just, and
to whom; and that equals ought to receive equal: but we should know
how we are to determine what things are equal and what unequal; and in
this there is some difficulty, which calls for the philosophy of the
politician. Some persons will probably say, that the employments of
the state ought to be given according to every particular excellence
of each citizen, if there is no other difference between them and the
rest of the community, but they are in every respect else alike: for
justice attributes different things to persons differing from each
other in their character, according to their respective merits. But if
this is admitted to be true, complexion, or height, or any such
advantage will be a claim for a greater share of the public rights.
But that this is evidently absurd is clear from other arts and
sciences; for with respect to musicians who play on the flute
together, the best flute is not given to him who is of the best
family, for he will play never the better for that, but the best
instrument ought to be given to him who is the best artist.

If what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it still
further: if there should be any one, a very excellent player on the
flute, but very deficient in family and beauty, though each of them
are more valuable endowments than a skill in music, and excel this art
in a higher degree than that player excels others, yet the best flutes
ought to be given to him; for the superiority [1283a] in beauty and
fortune should have a reference to the business in hand; but these
have none. Moreover, according to this reasoning, every possible
excellence might come in comparison with every other; for if bodily
strength might dispute the point with riches or liberty, even any
bodily strength might do it; so that if one person excelled in size
more than another did in virtue, and his size was to qualify him to
take place of the other's virtue, everything must then admit of a
comparison with each other; for if such a size is greater than virtue
by so much, it is evident another must be equal to it: but, since this
is impossible, it is plain that it would be contrary to common sense
to dispute a right to any office in the state from every superiority
whatsoever: for if one person is slow and the other swift, neither is
the one better qualified nor the other worse on that account, though
in the gymnastic races a difference in these particulars would gain
the prize; but a pretension to the offices of the state should be
founded on a superiority in those qualifications which are useful to
it: for which reason those of family, independency, and fortune, with
great propriety, contend with each other for them; for these are the
fit persons to fill them: for a city can no more consist of all poor
men than it can of all slaves But if such persons are requisite, it is
evident that those also who are just and valiant are equally so; for
without justice and valour no state can be supported, the former being
necessary for its existence, the latter for its happiness. _

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