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A Treatise on Government, a non-fiction book by Aristotle

BOOK I - CHAPTER VI

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_ But it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain the
contrary opinion have some reason on their side; for a man may become
a slave two different ways; for he may be so by law also, and this law
is a certain compact, by which whatsoever is taken in battle is
adjudged to be the property of the conquerors: but many persons who
are conversant in law call in question this pretended right, and say
that it would be hard that a man should be compelled by violence to be
the slave and subject of another who had the power to compel him, and
was his superior in strength; and upon this subject, even of those who
are wise, some think one way and some another; but the cause of this
doubt and variety of opinions arises from hence, that great abilities,
when accompanied with proper means, are generally able to succeed by
force: for victory is always owing to a superiority in some
advantageous circumstances; so that it seems that force never prevails
but in consequence of great abilities. But still the dispute
concerning the justice of it remains; for some persons think, that
justice consists in benevolence, others think it just that the
powerful should govern: in the midst of these contrary opinions, there
are no reasons sufficient to convince us, that the right of being
master and governor ought not to be placed with those who have the
greatest abilities. Some persons, entirely resting upon the right
which the law gives (for that which is legal is in some respects
just), insist upon it that slavery occasioned by war is just, not that
they say it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon
which the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover no one will say that
a man who is unworthily in slavery is therefore a slave; for if so,
men of the noblest families might happen to be slaves, and the
descendants of slaves, if they should chance to be taken prisoners in
war and sold: to avoid this difficulty they say that such persons
should not be called slaves, but barbarians only should; but when they
say this, they do nothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature,
which was what we at first said; for we must acknowledge that there
are some persons who, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves,
but others in no situation; thus also it is with those of noble
descent: it is not only in their own country that they are Esteemed as
such, but everywhere, but the barbarians are respected on this account
at home only; as if nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one
universal, the other not so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes:

"Who dares reproach me with the name of slave? When from the
immortal gods, on either side, I draw my lineage."

Those who express sentiments like these, shew only that they
distinguish the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from
each other by their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it
reasonable, that as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a
good man, a good man should be descended; and this is what nature
desires to do, but frequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then
that this doubt has some reason in it, and that these persons are not
slaves, and those freemen, by the appointment of nature; and also that
in some instances it is sufficiently clear, that it is advantageous to
both parties for this man to be a slave, and that to be a master, and
that it is right and just, that some should be governed, and others
govern, in the manner that nature intended; of which sort of
government is that which a master exercises over a slave. But to
govern ill is disadvantageous to both; for the same thing is useful to
the part and to the whole, to the body and to the soul; but the slave
is as it were a part of the master, as if he were an animated part of
his body, though separate. For which reason a mutual utility and
friendship may subsist between the master and the slave, I mean when
they are placed by nature in that relation to each other, for the
contrary takes place amongst those who are reduced to slavery by the
law, or by conquest. _

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Read previous: BOOK I: CHAPTER V

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