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Debate On A Motion For Indemnifying Evidence, a non-fiction book by Samuel Johnson |
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_ Lord HERVEY spoke next, to this effect:--My lords, as the bill now before us is of a new kind, upon an occasion no less new, I have endeavoured to bestow upon it a proportionate degree of attention, and have considered it in all the lights in which I could place it; I have, in my imagination, connected with it all the circumstances with which it is accompanied, and all the consequences that it may produce either to the present age, or to futurity; but the longer I reflect upon it, the more firmly am I determined to oppose it; nor has deliberation any other effect, than to crowd my thoughts with new arguments against it, and to heighten dislike to detestation. It must, my lords, immediately occur to every man, at the first mention of the method of proceeding now proposed, that it is such as nothing but extreme necessity can vindicate; that the noble person against whom it is contrived, must be a monster burdensome to the world; that his crimes must be at once publick and enormous, and that he has been already condemned by all maxims of justice, though he has had the subtilty to escape by some unforeseen defect in the forms of law. It might be imagined, my lords, that there were the most evident marks of guilt in the conduct of the man thus censured, that he fled from the justice of his country, that he had openly suborned witnesses in his favour, or had, by some artifice certainly known, obstructed the evidence that was to have been brought against him. It might at least be reasonably conceived, that his crimes were of such a kind as might in their own nature easily be concealed, and that, therefore, some extraordinary measures were necessary for the discovery of wickedness which lay out of the reach of common inquiry. But, my lords, none of these circumstances can be now alleged; for there is no certainty of any crime committed, nor any appearance of consciousness or fear in the person accused, who sets his enemies at defiance in full security, and declines no legal trial of his past actions; of which it ought to be observed, that they have, by the nature of his employments, been so publick, that they may easily be examined without recourse to a new law to facilitate discoveries. The bill, therefore, is, my lords, at least unnecessary, and an innovation not necessary ought always to be rejected, because no man can foresee all the consequences of new measures, or can know what evils they may create, or what subsequent changes they may introduce. The alteration of one part of a system naturally requires the alteration of another. But, my lords, that there is no necessity for this law now proposed, is not the strongest argument that may be brought against it, for there is in reality a necessity that it should be rejected. Justice and humanity are necessarily to be supported, without which no society can subsist, nor the life or property of any man be enjoyed with security: and neither justice nor humanity can truly be said to reside, where a law like this has met with approbation. My lords, to prosecute any man by such methods, is to overbear him by the violence of power, to take from him all the securities of innocence, and divest him of all the means of self-defence. It is to hire against him those whose testimonies ought not to be admitted, if they were voluntarily produced, and of which, surely, nothing will be farther necessary to annihilate the validity, than to observe that they are the depositions of men who are villains by their own confession, and of whom the nation sees, that they may save their lives by a bold accusation, whether true or false. That the bill will, indeed, be effectual to the purposes designed, that it will crowd the courts of justice with evidence, and open scenes of wickedness never discovered before, I can readily believe; for I cannot imagine that any man who has exposed his life by any flagrant crime, will miss so fair an opportunity of saving it by another. I shall expect, my lords, that villains of all denominations, who are now skulking in private retreats, who are eluding the officers of justice, or flying before the publick pursuit of the country, will secure themselves by this easy expedient; and that housebreakers, highwaymen, and pickpockets, will come up in crowds to the bar, charge the earl of ORFORD as their accomplice, and plead this bill as a security against all inquiry. That this supposition, however wild and exaggerated it may seem, may not be thought altogether chimerical; that it may appear with how little consideration this bill has been drawn, and how easily it may be perverted to the patronage of wickedness, I will lay before your lordships such a plea as may probably be produced by it. A man whom the consciousness of murder has for some time kept in continual terrours, may clear himself for ever, by alleging, that he was commissioned by the earl of ORFORD to engage, with any certain sum, the vote or interest of the murdered person; that he took the opportunity of a solitary place to offer him the bribe, and prevail upon him to comply with his proposals; but that finding him obstinate and perverse, filled with prejudices against a wise and just administration, and inclined to obstruct the measures of the government, he for some time expostulated with him; and being provoked by his contumelious representations of the state of affairs, he could no longer restrain the ardour of his loyalty, but thought it proper to remove from the world a man so much inclined to spread sedition among the people; and that, therefore, finding the place convenient, he suddenly rushed upon him and cut his throat. Thus, my lords, might the murderer represent his case, perhaps, without any possibility of a legal confutation; thus might the most atrocious villanies escape censure, by the assistance of impudence and cunning. A bill like this, my lords, is nothing less than a proscription; the head of a citizen is apparently set to sale, and evidence is hired, by which the innocent and the guilty may be destroyed with equal facility. It is apparent, my lords, that they by whom this bill is proposed, act upon the supposition that the noble person mentioned in it, is guilty of all those crimes of which he is suspected; a supposition, my lords, which it is unjust to make, and to which neither reason, nor the laws of our country, will give countenance or support. I, my lords, will much more equitably suppose him innocent; I will suppose that he has, throughout all the years of his administration, steadily prosecuted the best ends, by the best means; that if he has sometimes been mistaken or disappointed, it has been neither by his negligence nor ignorance, but by false intelligence, or accidents not to be foreseen; and that he has never either sacrificed his country to private interest, or procured, by any illegal methods, the assistance and support of the legislature; and I will ask your lordships, whether, if this character be just, the bill ought to be passed, and doubt not but every man's conscience will inform him, that it ought to be rejected with the utmost indignation. The reason, my lords, for which it ought to be rejected, is evidently this, that it may bring innocence into danger. But, my lords, every man before his trial is to be supposed innocent, and, therefore, no man ought to be exposed to the hazards of a trial, by which virtue and wickedness are reduced to a level. A bill like this ought to be marked out as the utmost effort of malice, as a species of cruelty never known before, and as a method of prosecution which this house has censured. I did not, indeed, expect from those who have so long clamoured with incessant vehemence against the measures of the ministry, such an open confession of their own weakness. Nothing, my lords, was so frequently urged, or so warmly exaggerated, as the impossibility of procuring evidence against a man in power; nothing was more confidently asserted, than that his guilt would be easily proved when his authority was at an end; and that even his own agents would readily detect him, when they were no longer dependant upon his favour. The time, my lords, so long expected, and so ardently desired, is at length come; this noble person whom they have so long pursued with declamations, invectives, and general reproaches, has at length resigned those offices which set him above punishment or trial; he is now without any other security than that by which every other man is sheltered from oppression, the publick protection of the laws of his country; but he is yet found impregnable, he is yet able to set his enemies at defiance; and they have, therefore, now, with great sagacity, contrived a method by which he may be divested of the common privileges of a social being, and may be hunted like a wild beast, without defence, and without pity. Where, my lords, can it be expected that malice like this will find an end? Is it not reasonable to imagine that if they should be gratified in this demand, and should find even this expedient baffled by the abilities which they have so often encountered without success, they would proceed to measures yet more atrocious, and punish him without evidence, whom they call to a trial without a crime. It has been observed by the noble lord who spoke last, that there are crimes mentioned in the report of the secret committee of the house of commons, or that at least such facts are asserted in it, that an accusation may, by easy deductions, be formed from them. The report of that committee, my lords, with whatever veneration it may be mentioned, by those whose purposes it happens to favour, or of whatever importance it may be in the other house, is here nothing but a pamphlet, not to be regarded as an evidence, or quoted as a writing of authority. It is only an account of facts of which we know not how they were collected, and which every one may admit or reject at his own choice, till they are ascertained by proper evidence at our own bar, and which, therefore, ought not to influence our opinion in the present debate. Nor is the bill, my lords, only founded upon principles inconsistent with the constitution of this nation, apparently tending to the introduction of a new species of oppression, but is in itself such as cannot be ratified without injury to the honour of this great assembly. In examining the bill, my lords, I think it not necessary to dwell upon the more minute and trivial defects of the orthography and expression, though they are such as might justly give occasion for suspecting that they by whom it was written, were no less strangers to our language than to our constitution. There are errours or falsehoods which it more nearly concerns us to detect, and to which we cannot give any sanction, without an evident diminution of our own authority. It declares, my lords, that there is now an inquiry depending before the senate, an assertion evidently false, for the inquiry is only before the commons. Whether this was inserted by mistake or design, whether it was intended to insinuate that the whole senatorial power was comprised in the house of commons, or to persuade the nation that your lordships concurred with them in this inquiry, it is not possible to determine; but since it is false in either sense, it ought not to receive our confirmation. If we should pass the bill in its present state, we should not only declare our approbation of the measures hitherto pursued by the commons, by which it has been already proved, by the noble and learned lord who spoke first against the bill, that they have not only violated the law, but invaded the privileges of this house. We should not only establish for ever in a committee of the house of commons, the power of examining upon oath, by an elusive and equivocatory expedient, but we should in effect vote away our own existence, give up at once all authority in the government, and grant them an unlimited power, by acknowledging them the senate, an acknowledgment which might, in a very short time, be quoted against us, and from which it would not be easy for us to extricate ourselves. It has, indeed, been remarked, that there is a large sum of money disbursed without account, and the publick is represented as apparently injured, either by fraud or negligence; but it is not remembered that none but his majesty has a right to inquire into the distribution of the revenue appropriated to the support of his family and dignity, and the payment of his servants, and which, therefore, cannot, in any degree, be called publick money, or fall under the cognizance of those whom it concerns to inspect the national accounts. Either the civil list must be exempt from inquiries, or his majesty must be reduced to a state below that of the meanest of his subjects; he can enjoy neither freedom nor property, and must be debarred for ever from those blessings which he is incessantly labouring to secure to others. There is, likewise, another consideration, which my regard for the honour of this assembly suggested to me, and of which I doubt not but that all your lordships will allow the importance. The noble person who is pointed out in this bill as a publick criminal, and whom all the villains of the kingdom are invited to accuse, is invested with the same honours as ourselves, and has a son who has for many years possessed a seat amongst us; let us not, therefore, concur with the commons to load our own house with infamy, and to propagate reproach, which will at last fix upon ourselves. Innumerable are the objections, my lords, which might yet be urged, and urged without any possibility of reply; but as I have already been heard with so much patience, I think what has been already mentioned sufficient to determine the question: and as I doubt not but the other defects and absurdities will be observed, if it be necessary, by some other lords, I shall presume only to add, that as the bill appears to me contrary to the laws of this nation, to the common justice of society, and to the general reason of mankind, as it must naturally establish a precedent of oppression, and confirm a species of authority in the other house which was either never claimed before, or always denied; as I think the most notorious and publick criminal ought not to be deprived of that method of defence which the established customs of our country allow him, and believe the person mentioned in this bill to deserve rather applauses and rewards, than censures and punishments, I think myself obliged to oppose it, and hope to find your lordships unanimous in the same opinion. Then the duke of ARGYLE answered, in substance as follows:--My lords, whatever may be the fate of this question, I have little hope that it will be unanimously decided, because I have reason to fear that some lords have conceived prejudices against the bill, which hinder them from discovering either its reasonableness or its necessity; and am convinced that others who approve the bill, can support their opinion by arguments from which, as they cannot be confuted, they never will recede. Those arguments which have influenced my opinion, I will lay before your lordships, and doubt not of showing that I am very far from giving way to personal malice, or the prejudices of opposition; and that I regard only the voice of reason, and the call of the nation. Calmness and impartiality, my lords, have been, with great propriety, recommended to us by the noble lord who spoke first in this debate; and I hope he will discover by the moderation with which I shall deliver my sentiments on this occasion, how much I reverence his precepts, and how willingly I yield to his authority. I am at least certain, that I have hitherto listened to the arguments that have been offered on either side with an attention void of prejudice; I have repressed no motions of conviction, nor abstracted my mind from any difficulty, to avoid the labour of solving it: I have been solicitous to survey every position in its whole extent, and trace it to its remotest consequences; I have assisted the arguments against the bill by favourable suppositions, and imaginary circumstances, and have endeavoured to divest my own opinion of some appendant and accidental advantages, that I might view it in a state less likely to attract regard; and yet I cannot find any reason by which I could justify myself to my country or my conscience, if I should concur in rejecting this bill, or should not endeavour to promote it. I am not unacquainted, my lords, with the difficulties that obstruct the knowledge of our own hearts, and cannot deny that inclination may be sometimes mistaken for conviction; and men even wise and honest, may imagine themselves to believe what, in reality, they only wish: but this, my lords, can only happen for want of attention, or on sudden emergencies, when it is necessary to determine with little consideration, while the passions have not yet time to subside, and reason is yet struggling with the emotions of desire. In other circumstances, my lords, I am convinced that no man imposes on himself without conniving at the fraud, without consciousness that he admits an opinion which he has not well examined, and without consulting indolence rather than reason; and, therefore, my lords, I can with confidence affirm, that I now declare my real opinion, and that if I err, I err only for want of abilities to discover the truth; and hope it will appear to your lordships, that I have been misled at least by specious arguments, and deceived by fallacious appearances, which it is no reproach not to have been able to detect. It will, my lords, be granted, I suppose, without hesitation, that the law is consistent with itself; that it never at the same time commands and prohibits the same action; that it cannot be at once violated and observed. From thence it will inevitably follow, that where the circumstances of any transaction are such, that the principles of that law by which it is cognizable are opposite to each other, some expedients may be found by which these circumstances may be altered. Otherwise a subtle or powerful delinquent will always find shelter in ambiguities, and the law will remain inactive, like a balance loaded equally on each side. On the present occasion, my lords, I pronounce with the utmost confidence, as a maxim of indubitable certainty, that the publick has a claim to every man's evidence, and that no man can plead exemption from this duty to his country. But those whom false gratitude, or contracted notions of their own interest, or fear of being entangled in the snares of examination, prompt to disappoint the justice of the publick, urge with equal vehemence, and, indeed, with equal truth, that no man is obliged to accuse himself, and that the constitution of Britain allows no man's evidence to be extorted from him to his own destruction. Thus, my lords, two of the first principles of the British law, though maxims equally important, equally certain, and equally to be preserved from the least appearance of violation, are contradictory to each other, and neither can be obeyed, because neither can be infringed. How then, my lords, is this contradiction to be reconciled, and the necessity avoided of breaking the law on one side or the other, but by the method now proposed, of setting those whose evidence is required, free from the danger which they may incur by giving it. The end of the law is the redress of wrong, the protection of right, and the preservation of happiness; and the law is so far imperfect as it fails to produce the end for which it is instituted; and where any imperfection is discovered, it is the province of the legislature to supply it. By the experience, my lords, of one generation after another, by the continued application of successive ages, was our law brought to its present accuracy. As new combinations of circumstances, or unforeseen artifices of evasion, discovered to our ancestors the insufficiency of former provisions, new expedients were invented; and as wickedness improved its subtilty, the law multiplied its powers and extended its vigilance. If I should, therefore, allow, what has been urged, that there is no precedent of a bill like this, what can be inferred from it, but that wickedness has found a shelter that was never discovered before, and which must be forced by a new method of attack? And what then are we required to do more than has been always done by our ancestors, on a thousand occasions of far less importance? I know not, my lords, whether it be possible to imagine an emergence that can more evidently require the interposition of the legislative power, than this which is now proposed to your consideration. The nation has been betrayed in peace, and disgraced in war; the constitution has been openly invaded, the votes of the commons set publickly to sale, the treasures of the publick have been squandered to purchase security to those by whom it was oppressed, the people are exasperated to madness, the commons have begun the inquiry that has been for more than twenty years demanded and eluded, and justice is on a sudden insuperably retarded by the deficiency of the law. Surely, my lords, this is an occasion that may justify the exertion of unusual powers, and yet nothing either new or unusual is required; for the bill now proposed may be supported both by precedents of occasional laws, and parallel statutes of lasting obligation. When frauds have been committed by the agents of trading companies, bills of indemnity to those by whom any discoveries should be made, have been proposed and passed without any of those dreadful consequences which some noble lords have foreseen in this. I have never heard that any man was so stupid as to mistake such a bill for a general act of grace, or that the confession of any crimes was procured by it, except of those which it was intended to detect; I have never been informed, that any murderer was blessed with the acuteness of the noble lord, or thought of flying to such an act as to a common shelter for villany. Such suppositions, my lords, can be intended only to prolong a controversy and weary an opponent; nor can such trifling exaggerations contribute to any other end, than of discovering the fertility of imagination, and the exuberance of eloquence. _ |