Part 2

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_ Let us suppose, my lords, that the bill now under our consideration, assigned a pecuniary reward to any man who should appear against this person, with a clause by which he that should accuse him falsely should be dismissed without his pay; would not this appear a method of prosecution contrary to law, and reason, and justice? Would not every man immediately discover, that the witnesses were bribed, and therefore they would deserve no credit? And what is the difference between the advantage now offered and any other consideration, except that scarcely any other reward can be offered so great, and consequently so likely to influence?

It is to be remembered, that the patrons of this bill evidently call for testimony from the abandoned and the profligate, from men whom they suppose necessarily to confess their own crimes in their depositions; and surely wretches like these ought not to be solicited to perjury by the offer of a reward.

How cruel must all impartial spectators of the publick transactions account a prosecution like this? What would be your lordships' judgment, should you read, that in any distant age, or remote country, a man was condemned upon the evidence of persons publickly hired to accuse him, and who, by their own confession, were traitors to their country?

That wickedness, my lords, should be extirpated by severity, and justice rigorously exercised upon publick offenders, is the uncontroverted interest of every country; and therefore it is not to be doubted, that in all ages the reflections of the wisest men have been employed upon the most proper methods of detecting offences; and since the scheme now proposed has never been practised, or never but by the most oppressive tyrants, in the most flagitious times, it is evident, that it has been thought inconsistent with equity, and of a tendency contrary to publick happiness.

I am very far, my lords, from desiring that any breach of national trust should escape detection, or that a publick office should afford security to bribery, extortion, or corruption. I am far from intending to patronise the conduct of the person mentioned in the present bill. Let the commons proceed with the utmost severity, but let them not deviate from justice. If he has forfeited his fortune, his honours, or his life, let them by a legal process be taken from him; but let it always be considered, that he, like every other man, is to be allowed the common methods of self-defence; that he is to stand or fall by the laws of his country, and to retain the privileges of a Briton, till it shall appear that he has forfeited them by his crimes.

To censure guilt, my lords, is undoubtedly necessary, and to inquire into the conduct of men in power, incontestably just; but by the laws both of heaven and earth, the means as well as the end are prescribed, rectum recte, legitimum legitime faciendum; we must not only propose a good end in our conduct, but must attain it by that method which equity directs, and the law prescribes.

How well, my lords, the law has been observed hitherto, on this occasion, I cannot but propose that your lordships should consider. It is well known, that the commons cannot claim a right to administer an oath, and therefore can only examine witnesses by simple interrogatories. That they cannot confer upon a committee the power which they have not themselves, is indubitably certain; and therefore it is evident, that they have exceeded their privileges, and proceeded in their inquiry by methods which the laws of this nation will not support.

That they cannot, my lords, in their own right administer an oath, they apparently confess, by the practice of calling in, on that occasion, a justice of the peace, who, as soon as he has performed his office, is expected to retire. This, my lords, is an evident elusion; for it is always intended, that he who gives an oath, gives it in consequence of his right to take the examination; but in this case the witness takes an oath, coram non judice, before a magistrate that has no power to interrogate him, and is interrogated by those who have no right to require his oath.

Such, my lords, is my opinion of the conduct of the committee of the house of commons, of whom I cannot but conclude that they have assumed a right which the constitution of our government confers only on your lordships, as a house of senate, a court of judicature; and therefore cannot think it prudent to confirm their proceedings by an approbation of this bill.

The commons may indeed imagine that the present state of affairs makes it necessary to proceed by extraordinary methods; they may believe that the nation will not be satisfied without a discovery of those frauds which have been so long practised, and the punishment of those men by whom they have so long thought themselves betrayed and oppressed; but let us consider, that clamour is not evidence, and that we ought not either to recede from justice, or from our own rights, to satisfy the expectations of the people.

To remonstrate against this invasion of our privileges, my lords, might be at this juncture improper; the dispute might, in this time of commotion and vicissitude, distract the attention of those to whom the publick affairs are committed, retard the business of the nation, and give our enemies those advantages which they can never hope from their own courage, or policy, or strength. It may, therefore, be prudent on this occasion, only not to admit the right which they have assumed, to satisfy ourselves with retaining our privileges, without requiring any farther confirmation of them, and only defeat the invasion of them by rejecting the bill, which is, indeed, of such a kind, as cannot be confirmed without hazarding not only our own rights, but those of every Briton.

For here is a species of testimony invited, which is hitherto unknown to our law, and from which it may be difficult to tell who can be secure; the witnesses are required to disclose all matters relating to the conduct of lord ORFORD, according to the best of their knowledge, remembrance, or belief! A form of deposition, my lords, of great latitude; a man's belief may be influenced by the report of others who may deceive him, by his observation of circumstances, either remote in themselves, or imperfectly discovered, or by his own reasonings, which must be just or fallacious according to his abilities; but which must yet have the same effect upon his belief, which they will influence, not in proportion to their real strength, but to the confidence placed in them by himself.

There is only one case, my lords, in which, by the common course of proceedings, any regard is had to mere belief; and this evidence is only accepted on that occasion, because no other can possibly be obtained. When any claim is to be determined by written evidences, of which, in order to prove their validity, it is necessary to inquire by whom they were drawn or signed; those who are acquainted with the writing of a dead person, are admitted to deliver, upon oath, their belief that the writing ascribed to him, was or was not his; but such secondary witnesses are never called, when the person can be produced whose hand is to be proved.

There is yet another reason for which it is improper to admit such evidence as this bill has a tendency to promote. It is well known, that in all the courts of common law, the person accused is in some degree secured from the danger of being overborne by false accusations, by the penalty which may be inflicted upon witnesses discovered to be perjured; but in the method of examination now proposed, a method unknown to the constitution, no such security can be obtained, for there is no provision made by the laws for the punishment of a man who shall give false evidence before a committee of the house of commons.

It may likewise be observed, that this bill wants one of the most essential properties of a law, perspicuity and determinate meaning; here is an indemnity promised to those who shall discover all that they know, remember, or believe. A very extensive demand, and which may, therefore, be liable to more fallacies and evasions than can be immediately enumerated or detected. For how can any one prove that he has a claim to the indemnity? He may, indeed, make some discoveries, but whether he does not conceal something, who can determine? May not such reserves be suspected, when his answers shall not satisfy the expectations of his interrogators? And may not that suspicion deprive him of the benefit of the act? May not a man, from want of memory, or presence of mind, omit something at his examination which he may appear afterwards to have known? And since no human being has the power of distinguishing exactly between faults and frailties, may not the defect of his memory be charged on him as a criminal suppression of a known fact? And may not he be left to suffer the consequences of his own confession? Will not the bill give an apparent opportunity for partiality? And will not life and death, liberty and imprisonment, be placed in the hands of a committee of the commons? May they not be easily satisfied with informations of one man, and incessantly press another to farther discoveries? May they not call some men, notoriously criminal, to examination, only to secure them from punishment, and set them out of the reach of justice; and extort from others such answers as may best promote their views, by declaring themselves unsatisfied with the extent of their testimony? And will not this be an extortion of evidence equivalent to the methods practised in the most despotick governments, and the most barbarous nations?

It has always been the praise of this house to pay an equal regard to justice and to mercy, and to follow, without partiality, the direction of reason, and the light of truth; and how consistently with this character, which it ought to be our highest ambition to maintain, we can ratify the present bill, your lordships are this day to consider. It is to be inquired, whether to suppose a man guilty, only because some guilt is suspected, be agreeable to justice; and whether it be rational before there is any proof of a crime, to point out the criminal.

We are to consider, my lords, whether it is not unjust to hear, against any man, an evidence who is hired to accuse him, and hired with a reward which he cannot receive without confessing himself a man unworthy of belief. It is to be inquired, whether the evidence of a man who declares only what he believes, ought to be admitted, when the nature of the crimes allows stronger proof; and whether any man ought to be examined where he cannot be punished if he be found perjured.

A natural and just regard to our own rights, on the preservation of which the continuance of the constitution must depend, ought to, alarm us at the appearance of any attempt to invade them; and the necessity of known forms of justice, ought to incite us to the prevention of any innovation in the methods of prosecuting offenders.

For my own part, my lords, I cannot approve either the principles or form of the bill. I think it necessary to proceed by known precedents, when there is no immediate danger that requires extraordinary measures, of which I am far from being convinced that they are necessary on the present occasion. I think that the certainty of a crime ought to precede the prosecution of a criminal, and I see that there is, in the present case, no crime attempted to be proved. The commons have, in my opinion, already exceeded their privileges, and I would not willingly confirm their new claims. For these reasons, my lords, I openly declare, that I cannot agree to the bill's being read a second time.

Lord TALBOT spoke next, to this effect:--My lords, so high is my veneration for this great assembly, that it is never without the utmost efforts of resolution that I can prevail upon myself to give my sentiments upon any question that is the subject of debate, however strong may be my conviction, or however ardent my zeal.

But in a very particular degree do I distrust my own abilities, when I find my opinion contrary to that of the noble lord who has now spoken; and it is no common perplexity to be reduced to the difficult choice of either suppressing my thoughts, or exposing them to so disadvantageous a contrast.

Yet, since such is my present state, that I cannot avoid a declaration of my thoughts on this question, without being condemned in my own breast as a deserter of my country, nor utter them without the danger of becoming contemptible in the eyes of your lordships; I will, however, follow my conscience, rather than my interest; and though I should lose any part of my little reputation, I shall find an ample recompense from the consciousness that I lost it in the discharge of my duty, on an occasion which requires from every good man the hazard of his life.

The arguments of the noble lord have had upon me an effect which they never, perhaps, produced on any part of his audience before; they have confirmed me in the contrary opinion to that which he has endeavoured to maintain. It has been remarked, that in some encounters, not to be put to flight is to obtain the victory; and, in a controversy with the noble lord, not to be convinced by him, is to receive a sufficient proof that the cause in which he is engaged is not to be defended by wit, eloquence, or learning.

On the present question, my lords, as on all others, he has produced all that can be urged, either from the knowledge of past ages, or experience of the present; all that the scholar or the statesman can supply has been accumulated, one argument has been added to another, and all the powers of a great capacity have been employed, only to show that right and wrong cannot be confounded, and that fallacy can never strike with the force of truth.

When I survey the arguments of the noble lord, disrobed of those ornaments which his imagination has so liberally bestowed upon them, I am surprised at the momentary effect which they had upon my mind, and which they could not have produced had they been clothed in the language of any other person.

For when I recollect, singly, the particular positions upon which his opinion seems to be founded, I do not find them by any means uncontrovertible; some of them seem at best uncertain, and some evidently mistaken.

That there is no apparent crime committed, and that, therefore, no legal inquiry can be made after the criminal, I cannot hear without astonishment. Is our commerce ruined, are our troops destroyed, are the morals of the people vitiated, is the senate crowded with dependants, are our fleets disarmed, our allies betrayed, and our enemies supported without a crime? Was there no certainty of any crime committed, when it was moved to petition his majesty to dismiss this person from his councils for ever.

It has been observed, my lords, that nothing but a sight of the dead body can warrant a pursuit after the murderer; but this is a concession sufficient for the present purpose; for if, upon the sight of a murdered person, the murderer may lawfully be inquired after, and those who are reasonably suspected detained and examined; with equal reason, my lords, may the survey of a ruined nation, a nation oppressed with burdensome taxes, devoured by the caterpillars of a standing army, sunk into contempt in every foreign court, and repining at the daily decay of its commerce, and the daily multiplication of its oppressors, incite us to an inquiry after the author of its miseries.

It is asserted, that no man ought to be called into question for any crime, who is not suspected of having committed it. This, my lords, is a rule not only reasonable in itself, but so naturally observed, that I believe it was never yet broken; and am certain, no man will be charged with the violation of it, for accusing this person as an enemy to his country.

But he that declares his suspicion, may be called upon to discover upon what facts it is founded; nor will this part of the law produce any difficulty in the present case; for as every man in the nation suspects this person of the most enormous crimes, every man can produce sufficient arguments to justify his opinion.

On all other occasions, my lords, publick fame is allowed some weight: that any man is universally accounted wicked, will add strength to the testimony brought against him for any particular offence; and it is at least a sufficient reason for calling any man to examination, that a crime is committed, and he is generally reported to be the author of it.

That this is the state of the person into whose conduct the commons are now inquiring; that he is censured by every man in the kingdom, whose sentiments are not repressed by visible influence; that he has no friends but those who have sold their integrity for the plunder of the publick; and that all who are not enemies to their country, have, for many years, incessantly struggled to drag him down from the pinnacle of power, and expose him to that punishment which he has so long deserved, and so long defied, is evident beyond contradiction.

Let it not, therefore, be urged, my lords, that there is no certainty of a crime which is proved to the conviction of every honest mind; let it not be said that it is unreasonable to suspect this man, whom the voice of the people, a voice always to be reverenced, has so long condemned.

The method of procuring evidence against him by an act of indemnity has been represented by the noble lord as not agreeable to justice or to law: in the knowledge of the law I am far from imagining myself able to contend with him; but I think it may not be improper to observe, that a person of the highest eminence in that profession, whose long study and great abilities give his decisions an uncommon claim to authority and veneration, and who was always considered in this house with the highest regard, appears to have entertained a very different opinion.

It was declared by him, without the least restriction, that all means were lawful which tended to the discovery of truth; and, therefore, the publick may justly expect that extraordinary methods should be used upon occasions of uncommon importance.

Nor does this expedient appear to me very remote from the daily practice of promising pardon to thieves, on condition that they will make discoveries by which their confederates may be brought to justice.

If we examine only the equity of this procedure, without regard to the examples of former times, it appears to me easily defensible; for what can be more rational than to break a confederacy of wretches combined for the destruction of the happiness of mankind, by dividing their interest, and making use, for the publick good, of that regard for their own safety, which has swallowed up every other principle of action?

It is admitted that wickedness ought to be punished, and it is universally known that punishment must be preceded by detection; any method, therefore, that promotes the discovery of crimes may be considered as advantageous to the publick.

As there is no wickedness of which the pernicious consequences are more extensive, there is none which ought more diligently to be prevented, or more severely punished, than that of those men who have dared to abuse the power which their country has put into their hands; but how they can be convicted by any other means than those which are now proposed, I confess myself unable to discover; for by a very small degree of artifice, a man invested with power may make every witness a partner of his guilt, and no man will be able to accuse him, without betraying himself. In the present case it is evident, that the person of whose actions the bill now before us is designed to produce a more perfect discovery, has been combined with others in illegal measures, in measures which their own security obliges them to conceal, and which, therefore, the interest of the publick demands to be divulged.

That Paxton has distributed large sums for purposes which he dares not discover, we are informed by the reports of the secret committee; and I suppose every body suspects that they were distributed as rewards for services which the nation thinks not very meritorious, and I believe no man will ask what reason can be alleged for such suspicions.

But since it may be possibly suggested that Paxton expended these sums contrary to his master's direction, or without his knowledge, it may be demanded, whether such an assertion would not be an apparent proof of a very criminal degree of negligence in a man intrusted with the care of the publick treasure?

Thus, my lords, it appears in my opinion evident, that either he has concurred in measures which his servile agent, the mercenary tool of wickedness, is afraid to confess, or that he has stood by, negligent of his trust, and suffered the treasure of the nation to be squandered by the meanest wretches without account.

That the latter part of the accusation is undoubtedly just, the report of the commons cannot but convince us. It appears that for near eight years, Paxton was so high in confidence, that no account was demanded from him; he bestowed pensions at pleasure; he was surrounded, like his master, by his idolaters; and after the fatigue of cringing in one place, had an opportunity of purchasing the taxes of the nation, the gratification of tyranny in another.

I presume, my lords, that no man dares assert such a flagrant neglect of so important an office, to be not criminal in a very high degree; to steal in private houses that which is received in trust, is felony by the statutes of our country; and surely the wealth of the publick ought not to be less secured than that of individuals, nor ought he that connives at robbery to be treated with more lenity than the robber.

Therefore, my lords, as I cannot but approve of the bill, I move that it may be read a second time; and I hope the reasons which I have offered, when joined with others, which I expect to hear from lords of a greater experience, knowledge, and capacity, will induce your lordships to be of the same opinion. _

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