Part 6

________________________________________________
_ If the liberties of Europe be really in danger, if our treaties oblige us to assist the queen of Hungary against the invaders of her dominions, if the ambition of France requires to be repressed, and the powers of Germany to be animated against her by the certain prospect of a vigorous support, I cannot discover the propriety of this motion, even supposing that we have not found from the ministers all the respect that we have a right to demand. As a lawful authority may do wrong, so right may be sometimes done by an unlawful power; and surely, though usurpation ought to be punished, the benefits which have been procured by it, are not to be thrown away. We may retain the troops that have been hired, if they are useful, though we should censure the ministry for taking them into pay.

But the motion to which our concurrence is now required, is a motion by which we are to punish ourselves for the crime of the ministers, by which we are about to leave ourselves defenceless, because we have been armed without our consent, and to resign up all our rights and privileges to France, because we suspect that they have not been sufficiently regarded on this occasion by our ministers.

Those noble lords who have dwelt with the greatest ardour on this omission, have made no proposition for censuring those whom they condemn as the authors of it, though this objection must terminate in an inquiry into their conduct, and has no real relation to the true question now before us, which is, whether the auxiliaries be of any use? If they are useless, they ought to be discharged without any other reason; if they are necessary, they ought to be retained, whatever censure may fall upon the ministry.

I am, indeed, far from thinking, that when your lordships have sufficiently examined the affair, you will think your privileges invaded, or the publick trepanned by artifice into expensive measures; since it will appear that the ministry in reality preferred the most honest to the safest methods of proceeding, and chose rather to hazard themselves, than to practice or appear to practice any fraud upon their country.

When it was resolved in council to take the troops of Hanover into the pay of Britain, a resolution which, as your lordships have already been informed, was made only a few days before the senate rose, it was natural to consider, whether the consent of the senate should not be demanded; but when it appeared upon reflection, that to bring an affair of so great importance before the last remnant of a house of commons, after far the greater part had retired to the care of their own affairs, would be suspected as fraudulent, and might give the nation reason to fear, that such measures were intended as the ministers were afraid of laying before a full senate. It was thought more proper to defer the application to the next session, and to venture upon the measures that were formed, upon a full conviction of their necessity.

This conduct, my lords, was exactly conformable to the demands of those by whom the court has hitherto been opposed, and who have signalized themselves as the most watchful guardians of liberty. Among these men, votes of credit have never been mentioned but with detestation, as acts of implicit confidence, by which the riches of the nation are thrown down at the feet of the ministry to be squandered at pleasure. When it has been urged, that emergencies may arise, during the recess of the senate, which may produce a necessity of expenses, and that, therefore, some credit ought to be given which may enable the crown to provide against accidents, it has been answered, that the expenses which are incurred during the recess of the senate, will be either necessary or not; that if they are necessary, the ministry have no reason to distrust the approbation of the senate, but if they are useless, they ought not to expect it. And that, instead of desiring to be exempted from any subsequent censures, and to be secured in exactions or prodigality by a previous vote, they ought willingly to administer the publick affairs at their own hazard, and await the judgment of the senate, when the time shall come, in which their proceedings are laid before it.

Such have hitherto been the sentiments of the most zealous advocates for the rights of the people; nor did I expect from any man who desired to appear under that character, that he would censure the ministry for having thrown themselves upon the judgment of the senate, and neglected to secure themselves by any previous applications, for having trusted in their own integrity, and exposed their conduct to an open examination without subterfuges and without precautions. I did not imagine, my lords, that a senate, upon whose decision all the measures which have been taken, so apparently depend, would have been styled a senate convened only to register the determinations of the ministry; or that any of your lordships would think his privileges diminished, because money was not demanded before the use of it was fully known. If we lay aside, my lords, all inquiries into precedents, and, without regard to any political considerations, examine this affair only by the light of reason, it will surely appear that the ministry could not, by any other method of proceeding, have shown equal regard to the senate, or equal confidence in their justice and their wisdom. Had they desired a vote of credit, it might have been justly objected that they required to be trusted with the publick money, without declaring, or being able to declare, how it was to be employed; that either they questioned the wisdom or honesty of the senate; and, therefore, durst undertake nothing till they were secure of the supplies necessary for the execution of it. Had they informed both houses of their whole scheme, they might have been still charged, and charged with great appearance of justice, with having preferred their own safety to that of the publick, and having rather discovered their designs to the enemy, than trusted to the judgment of the senate; nor could any excuse have been made for a conduct so contrary to all the rules of war, but such as must have dis-honoured either the ministers or the senate, such as must have implied either that the measures intended were unworthy of approbation, or that they were by no means certain, that even the best conduct would not be censured.

These objections they foresaw, and allowed to be valid; and, therefore, generously determined to pursue the end which every man was supposed to approve, by the best means which they could discover, and to refer their conduct to a full senate, in which they did not doubt but their integrity, and, perhaps, their success, would find them vindicators. Instead of applying, therefore, to the remains of the commons, a few days before the general recess; instead of assembling their friends by private intimations, at a time when most of those from whom they might have dreaded opposition, had retired, they determined to attempt, at their own hazard, whatever they judged necessary for the promotion of the common cause, and to refer their measures to the senate, when it should be again assembled.

The manner in which one of the noble lords, who have spoken in support of the address, has thought it necessary that they should have applied to us, is, indeed, somewhat extraordinary, such as is certainly without precedent, and such as is not very consistent with the constituent rights of the different powers of the legislature. His lordship has been pleased to remark, that the crown has entered into a treaty, and to ask why that treaty was not previously laid before the senate for its approbation.

I know not, my lords, with what propriety this contract for the troops of Hanover can be termed a treaty. It is well known that no power in this kingdom can enter into a treaty with a foreign state, except the king; and it is equally certain, that, with regard to Hanover, the same right is limited to the elector. This treaty, therefore, my lords, is a treaty of the same person with himself, a treaty of which the two counterparts are to receive their ratification from being signed with the same hand. This, surely, is a treaty of a new kind, such as no national assembly has yet considered. Had any other power of Britain than its king, or in Hanover any other than the elector, the right of entering into publick engagements, a treaty might have been made; but as the constitution of both nations is formed, the treaty is merely chimerical and absolutely impossible.

Had such a treaty, as is thus vainly imagined, been really made, it would yet be as inconsistent with the fundamental establishment of the empire, to require that before it was ratified it should have been laid before the senate. To make treaties, as to make war, is the acknowledged and established prerogative of the crown. When war is declared, the senate is, indeed, to consider whether it ought to be carried on at the expense of the nation; and if treaties require any supplies to put them in execution, they likewise fall properly, at that time, under senatorial cognizance: but to require that treaties shall not be transacted without our previous concurrence, is almost to annihilate the power of the crown, and to expose all our designs to the opposition of our enemies, before they can be completed.

If, therefore, the troops of Hanover can be of use for the performance of our stipulations, if they can contribute to the support of the house of Austria, the ministry cannot, in my opinion, be censured for having taken them into British pay; nor can we refuse our concurrence with the commons in providing for their support, unless it shall appear that the design for which all our preparations have been made is such as cannot be executed, or such as ought not to be pursued.

Several arguments have been offered to prove both these positions; one noble lord has asserted, that it is by no means for the advantage either of ourselves or any other nation, to restore the house of Austria to its ancient elevation; another, that it is, by the imperial constitutions, unlawful for any of the princes of Germany to make war upon the emperour solemnly acknowledged by the diet. They have endeavoured to intimidate us, by turning our view to the difficulties by which our attempts are obstructed; difficulties which they affect to represent as insuperable, at least to this nation in its present state. With this design, my lords, has the greatness of the French power been exaggerated, the faith of the king of Sardinia questioned, and the king of Prussia represented as determined to support the pretensions of the emperour; with this view has our natural strength been depreciated, and all our measures and hopes have been ridiculed, with wantonness, not very consistent with the character of a British patriot.

Most of these arguments, my lords, have been already answered, and answered in such a manner as has, I believe, not failed of convincing every lord of their insufficiency, unless, perhaps, those are to be excepted ty whom they were offered. It has with great propriety been observed, that the inconsistency imputed to his majesty in opposing the emperour for whom he voted, is merely imaginary; since it is not a necessary consequence, that he for whom he voted is, therefore, lawfully elected; and because his majesty does not engage in this war for the sake of dethroning the emperour, but of supporting the Pragmatick sanction; nor does he oppose him as the head of the German body, but as the invader of the dominions of Austria.

With regard to the propriety of maintaining the Austrian family in its present possessions, and of raising it, if our arms should be prosperous, to its ancient greatness, it has been shown, that no other power is able to defend Europe either against the Turks on one part, or the French on the other; two powers equally professing the destructive intention of extending their dominions without limits, and of trampling upon the privileges and liberties of all the rest of mankind.

It has been shown, that the general scheme of policy uniformly pursued by our ancestors in every period of time, since the increase of the French greatness, has been to preserve an equipoise of power, by which all the smaller states are preserved in security. It is apparent, that by this scheme alone can the happiness of mankind be preserved, and that no other family but that of Austria is able to balance the house of Bourbon.

This equipoise of power has by some lords been imagined an airy scheme, a pleasing speculation which, however it may amuse the imagination, can never be reduced to practice. It has been asserted, that the state of nations is always variable, that dominion is every day transferred by ambition or by casualties, that inheritances fall by want of heirs into other hands, and that kingdoms are by one accident divided at one time, and at other times consolidated by a different event; that to be the guardians of all those whose credulity or folly may betray them to concur with the ambition of an artful neighbour, and to promote the oppression of themselves, is an endless task; and that to obviate all the accidents by which provinces may change their masters, is an undertaking to which no human foresight is equal; that we have not a right to hinder the course of succession for our own interest, nor to obstruct those contracts which independent princes are persuaded to make, however contrary to their own interest, or to the general advantage of mankind. And it has been concluded by those reasoners, that we should show the highest degree of wisdom, and the truest, though not the most refined policy, by attending steadily to our own interest, by improving the dissensions of our neighbours to our own advantage, by extending our commerce, and increasing our riches, without any regard to the happiness or misery, freedom or slavery of the rest of mankind.

I believe I need not very laboriously collect arguments to prove to your lordships that this scheme of selfish negligence, of supine tranquillity, is equally imprudent and ungenerous; since, if we examine the history of the last century, we shall easily discover, that if this nation had not interposed, the French had now been masters of more than half Europe; and it cannot be imagined that they would have suffered us to set them at defiance in the midst of their greatness, that they would have spared us out of tenderness, or forborne to attack us out of fear. What the Spaniards attempted, though unsuccessfully, from a more distant part of the world, in the pride of their American affluence, would certainly have been once more endeavoured by France, with far greater advantages, and as it may be imagined, with a different event.

That it would have been endeavoured, cannot be doubted, because the endeavour would not have been hazardous; by once defeating our fleet, they might land their forces, which might be wafted over in a very short time, and by a single victory they might conquer all the island, or that part of it, at least, which is most worth the labour of conquest; and though they should be unsuccessful, they could suffer nothing but the mortification of their pride, and would be in a short time enabled to make a new attempt.

Thus, my lords, if we could preserve our liberty in the general subjection of the western part of the world, we should do it only by turning our island into a garrison, by laying aside all other employment than the study of war, and by making it our only care to watch our coasts: a state which surely ought to be avoided at almost any expense and at any hazard.

To think that we could extend our trade or increase our riches in this state of the continent, is to forget the effects of universal empire. The French, my lords, would then be in possession of all the trade of those provinces which they had conquered, they would be masters of all their ports and of all their shipping; and your lordships may easily conceive with what security we should venture upon the ocean, in a state of war, when all the harbours of the continent afforded shelter to our enemies. If the French privateers from a few obscure creeks, unsupported by a fleet of war, or at least not supported by a navy equal to our own, could make such devastations in our trade as enabled their country to hold out against the confederacy of almost all the neighbouring powers; what, my lords, might not be dreaded by us, when every ship upon the ocean should be an enemy; when we should be at once overborne by the wealth and the numbers of our adversaries; when the trade of the world should be in their hands, and their navies no less numerous than their troops.

I have made this digression, my lords, I hope not wholly without necessity, to show that the advantages of preserving the equipoise of Europe are not, as they have been sometimes conceived, empty sounds, or idle notions; but that by the balance of one nation against another, both the safety of other countries and of our own is preserved; and that, therefore, it requires all our vigilance and all our resolution to establish and maintain it.

That there may come a time in which this scheme will be no longer practicable, when a coalition of dominions may be inevitable, and when one power will be necessarily exalted above the rest, is, indeed, not absolutely impossible, and, therefore, not to be peremptorily denied. But it is not to be inferred, that our care is vain at present, because, perhaps, it may some time be vain hereafter; or that we ought now to sink into slavery without a struggle, because the time may come, when our strongest efforts will be ineffectual.

It has, indeed, been almost asserted, that the fatal hour is now arrived, and that it is to no purpose that we endeavour to raise any farther opposition to the universal monarchy projected by France. We are told, that the nation is exhausted and dispirited; that we have neither influence, nor riches, nor courage remaining; that we shall be left to stand alone against the united house of Bourbon; that the Austrians cannot, and that the Dutch will not, assist us; that the king of Sardinia will desert his alliance; that the king of Prussia has declared against us; and, therefore, that by engaging in the support of the Pragmatick sanction, we are about to draw upon ourselves that ruin which every other power has foreseen and shunned.

I am far from denying, my lords, that the power of France is great and dangerous; but can draw no consequence from that position, but that this force is to be opposed before it is still greater, and this danger to be obviated while it is yet surmountable, and surmountable I still believe it by unanimity and courage.

If our wealth, my lords, is diminished, it is time to confine the commerce of that nation by which we have been driven out of the markets of the continent, by destroying their shipping, and intercepting their merchants. If our courage is depressed, it is depressed not by any change in the nature of the inhabitants of this island, but by a long course of inglorious compliance with the demands, and of mean submission to the insults, of other nations, to which it is necessary to put an end by vigorous resolutions.

If our allies are timorous and wavering, it is necessary to encourage them by vigorous measures; for as fear, so courage, is produced by example: the bravery of a single man may withhold an army from flight, and other nations will be ashamed to discover any dread of that power which France along sets at defiance. They will be less afraid to declare their intentions, when they are convinced that we intend to support them; and if there be, in reality, any prince who does not favour our design, he will be at least less inclined to obstruct it, as he finds the opposition, which he must encounter, more formidable.

For this reason, my lords, I am far from discovering the justness of the opinion which has prevailed very much in the nation, on this occasion, that we are not to act without allies, because allies are most easily to be procured by acting, and because it is reasonable and necessary for us to perform our part, however other powers may neglect theirs.

The advice which the senate has often repeated to his majesty, has been to oppose the progress of France; and though it should be allowed, that he has been advised to proceed in concert with his allies, yet it must be understood to suppose such allies as may be found to have courage and honesty enough to concur with him. It cannot be intended, that he should delay his assistance till corruption is reclaimed, or till cowardice is animated; for to promise the queen of Hungary assistance on such terms, would be to insult her calamities, and to withhold our succours till she was irrecoverably ruined. The senate could not insist that we should stand neuter, till all those, who were engaged by treaty to support the Pragmatick sanction, should appear willing to fulfil their stipulations; for even France is to be numbered among those who have promised to support the house of Austria in its possessions, however she may now endeavour to take them away.

Even with regard to that power from which most assistance may be reasonably expected, nothing would be more imprudent than to declare that we determine not to act without them; for what then would be necessary, but that the French influence one town in their provinces, or one deputy in their assemblies, and ruin the house of Austria in security and at leisure, without any other expense than that of a bribe.

It was, therefore, necessary to transport our troops into Flanders, to show the world that we were no longer inclined to stand idle spectators of the troubles of Europe; that we no longer intended to amuse ourselves, or our confederates, with negotiations which might produce no treaties, or with treaties which might be broken whenever the violation of them afforded any prospect of that advantage; we were now resolved to sacrifice the pleasures of neutrality, and the profits of peaceful traffick, to the security of the liberties of Europe, and the observation of publick faith.

This necessity was so generally allowed, that when the first body of troops was sent over, no objection was made by those who found themselves inclined to censure the conduct of our affairs, but that they were not sufficiently numerous to defend themselves, and would be taken prisoners by a French detachment; the ministry were therefore asked, why they did not send a larger force, why they engaged in hostilities, which could only raise the laughter of our enemies, and why, if they intended war, they did not raise an army sufficient to prosecute it?

An army, my lords, an army truly formidable, is now raised, and assembled on the frontiers of France, ready to assist our ally, and to put a stop to the violence of invasions. We now see ourselves once again united with the house of Austria, and may hope once more to drive the oppressors of mankind before us. But now, my lords, a clamour is propagated through the nation, that these measures, which have been so long desired, are pernicious and treacherous; that we are armed, not against France, but against ourselves; that our armies are sent over either not to fight, or to fight in a quarrel in which we have no concern; to gain victories from which this nation will receive no advantage, or to bring new dishonour upon their country by a shameful inactivity.

This clamour, which if it had been confined to the vulgar, had been, perhaps, of no great importance, nor could have promoted any of the designs of those by whom it was raised, has been mentioned in this house as an argument in favour of the motion which is now under the consideration of your lordships; and it has been urged that these measures cannot be proper, because all measures, by which his majesty's government is made unpopular, must in the end be destructive to the nation.

On this occasion, my lords, it is necessary to consider the nature of popularity, and to inquire how far it is to be considered in the administration of publick affairs. If by popularity is meant only a sudden shout of applause, obtained by a compliance with the present inclination of the people, however excited, or of whatsoever tendency, I shall without scruple declare, that popularity is to be despised; it is to be despised, my lords, because it cannot be preserved without abandoning much more valuable considerations. The inclinations of the people have, in all ages, been too variable for regard. But if by popularity be meant that settled confidence and lasting esteem, which a good government may justly claim from the subject, I am far from denying that it is truly desirable; and that no wise man ever disregarded it. But this popularity, my lords, is very consistent with contempt of riotous clamours, and of mistaken complaints; and is often only to be obtained by an opposition, to the reigning opinions, and a neglect of temporary discontents; opinions which may be inculcated without difficulty by favourite orators, and discontents which the eloquence of seditious writers may easily produce on ignorance and inconstancy.

How easily the opinions of the vulgar may be regulated by those who have obtained, by whatever methods, their esteem, the debate of this day, my lords, may inform us; since, if the measures against which this motion is intended, be really unpopular, as they have been represented, it is evident that there has been lately a very remarkable change in the sentiments of the nation; for it is yet a very little time since the repression of the insolence of France, and the relief of the queen of Hungary was so generally wished, and so importunately demanded, that had measures like these been then formed, it is not improbable that they might have reconciled the publick to that man whom the united voice of the nation has long laboured to overbear.

It is, indeed, urged with a degree of confidence, which ought, in my opinion, to proceed from stronger proof than has yet been produced, that no hostilities are intended; that our armaments on the continent are an idle show, an inoffensive ostentation, and that the troops of Hanover have been hired only to enrich the electorate, under the appearance of assisting the queen of Hungary, whom in reality they cannot succour without drawing upon their country the imperial interdict.

It has been alleged, my lords,-that these measures have been concerted wholly/or the advantage of Hanover; that this kingdom is to be sacrificed to the electorate, and that we are in reality intended to be made tributaries to a petty power.

In confirmation of these suggestions, advantage has been taken from every circumstance that could admit of misrepresentation. The constitution of the empire has been falsely quoted, to prove that they cannot act against the emperour, and their inactivity in Flanders has been produced as a proof, that they do not intend to enter Germany.

Whoever shall consult the constituent and fundamental pact by which the German form of government is established, will find, my lords, that it is not in the power of the emperour alone to lay any of the states of Germany under the ban; and that the electors are independent in their own dominions, so far as that they may enter into alliances with foreign powers, and make war upon each other.

It appears, therefore, my lords, that no law prohibits the elector of Hanover to send his troops to the assistance of the queen of Hungary; he may, in consequence of treaties, march into Germany, and attack the confederates of the emperour, or what is not now intended, even the emperour himself, without any dread of the severities of the ban.

Nor does the continuance of the forces in Flanders show any unwillingness to begin hostilities, or any dread of the power of either Prussia, whose prohibition is merely imaginary, or of France, who is not less perplexed by the neighbourhood of our army than by any other method that could have been taken of attacking her; for being obliged to have an equal force always in readiness to observe their motions, she has not been able to send a new army against the Austrians, but has been obliged to leave the emperour at their mercy, and suffer them to recover Bohemia without bloodshed, and establish themselves at leisure in Bavaria.

Nor is this, my lords, the only advantage which has been gained by their residence in Flanders; for the United Provinces have been animated to a concurrence in the common cause, and have consented so far to depart from their darling neutrality, as to send twenty thousand of their forces to garrison the barrier. Of which no man, I suppose, will say that it is not of great importance to the queen of Hungary, since it sets her free from the necessity of distracting her views, and dividing her forces for the defence of the most distant parts of her dominions at once; nor will it be affirmed, that this advantage could have probably been gained, without convincing our allies of our sincerity, by sending an army into the continent.

If it be asked, what is farther to be expected from these troops? it ought to be remembered, my lords, with how little propriety our ministers can be required to make publick a scheme of hostile operations, and how much we should expose ourselves to our enemies, should a precedent be established by which our generals would be incapacitated to form any private designs, and an end would be for ever put to military secrecy.

What necessity there can be for proposing arguments like these, I am not, indeed, able to discover, since the objections which have been made seem to proceed rather from obstinacy than conviction; and the reflections that have been vented seem rather the product of wit irritated by malevolence, than of reason enlightened by calm consideration. The ministers have been reproached with Hanoverian measures, without any proof that Hanover is to receive the least advantage; and have been charged with betraying their country by those who cannot show how their country is injured, nor can prove either that interest or faith would allow us to sit inactive in the present disturbance of Europe, or that we could have acted in any other manner with equal efficacy.

It is so far from being either evident or true, my lords, that Britain is sacrificed to Hanover, that Hanover is evidently hazarded by her union with Britain. Had this electorate now any other sovereign than the king of Great Britain, it might have been secure by a neutrality, and have looked upon the miseries of the neighbouring provinces without any diminution of its people, or disturbance of its tranquillity; nor could any danger be dreaded, or any inconvenience be felt, but from an open declaration in favour of the Pragmatick sanction.

Why the hire of the troops of any particular country should be considered as an act of submission to it, or of dependency upon it, I cannot discover; nor can I conceive for what reason the troops of Hanover should be more dangerous, or less popular, at this than at any former time, or why the employment of them should be considered as any particular regard. If any addition of dominion had been to be purchased for the electorate by the united arms of the confederate army, I should, perhaps, be inclined to censure the scheme, as contrary to the interest of my native country; nor shall any lord more warmly oppose designs that may tend to aggrandize another nation at the expense of this. But to hire foreigners, of whatever country, only to save the blood of Britons, is, in my opinion, an instance of preference which ought to produce rather acknowledgments of gratitude than sallies of indignation.

Upon the most exact survey of this debate, I will boldly affirm, that I never heard in this house a question so untenable in itself, so obstinately or so warmly debated; but hope that the sophistries which have been used, however artful, and the declamations which have been pronounced, however pathetick, will have no effect upon your lordships. I hope, that as the other house has already agreed to support the auxiliaries which have been retained, and which have been proved in this debate to be retained for the strongest reasons, and the most important purposes, your lordships will show, by rejecting this motion, that you are not less willing to concur in the support of publick faith, and that you will not suffer posterity to charge you with the exaltation of France, and the ruin of Europe.

[The question was then put, and determined in the negative, by 90 against 35.]

After the conclusion of this long debate, the ministry did not yet think their victory in repelling this censure sufficiently apparent, unless a motion was admitted, which might imply a full and unlimited approbation of their measures; and therefore the earl of SCARBOROUGH rose, and spoke to the following effect:--My lords, it has been justly observed in the debate of this day, that the opinions of the people of Britain are regulated in a great measure by the determinations of this house; that they consider this as the place where truth and reason obtain a candid audience; as a place sacred to justice and to honour; into which, passion, partiality, and faction have been very rarely known to intrude; and that they, therefore, watch our decisions as the great rules of policy, and standing maxims of right, and readily believe these measures necessary in which we concur, and that conduct unblameable which has gained our approbation.

This reputation, my lords, we ought diligently to preserve, by an unwearied vigilance for the happiness of our fellow-subjects; and while we possess it, we ought likewise to employ its influence to beneficial purposes, that the cause and the effect may reciprocally produce each other; that the people, when the prosperity which they enjoy by our care, inclines them to repose in us an implicit confidence, may find that confidence a new source of felicity; that they may reverence us, because they are secure and happy; and be secure and happy, because they reverence us.

This great end, my lords, it will not be very difficult to attain; the foundation of this exalted authority may easily be laid, and the superstructure raised in a short time; the one may be laid too deep to be undermined, and the other built too firmly to be shaken; at least they can be impaired only by ourselves, and may set all external violence at defiance.

To preserve the confidence of the people, and, consequently, to govern them without force, and without opposition, it is only necessary that we never willingly deceive them; that we expose the publick affairs to their view, so far as they ought to be made publick in their true state; that we never suffer false reports to circulate under the sanction of our authority, nor give the nation reason to think we are satisfied, when we are, in reality, suspicious of illegal designs, or that we suspect those measures of latent mischiefs with which we are, in reality, completely satisfied.

But it is not sufficient, my lords, that we publish ourselves no fallacious representations of our counsels; it is necessary, likewise, that we do not permit them to be published, that we obviate every falsehood in its rise, and propagate truth with our utmost diligence. For if we suffer the nation to be deceived, we are not much less criminal than those who deceive it; at least we must be confessed no longer to act as the guardians of the publick happiness, if we suffer it to be interrupted by the dispersion of reports which we know to be at once false and pernicious.

Of these principles, which I suppose will not be contested, an easy application may be made to the business of the present day. A question has been debated with great address, great ardour, and great obstinacy, which is in itself, though not doubtful, yet very much diffused; complicated with a great number of circumstances, and extended to a multitude of relations; and is, therefore, a subject upon which sophistry may very safely practise her arts, and which may be shown in very different views to those whose intellectual light is too much contracted to receive the whole object at once. It may easily be asserted, by those who have long been accustomed to affirm, without scruple, whatever they desire to obtain belief, that the arguments in favour of the motion, which has now been rejected by your lordships, were unanswerable; and it will be no hard task to lay before their audience such reasons as, though they have been easily confuted by the penetration and experience of your lordships, may, to men unacquainted with politicks, and remote from the sources of intelligence, appear very formidable.

It is, therefore, not sufficient that your lordships have rejected the former motion, and shown that you do not absolutely disapprove the measures of the government, since it may be asserted, and with some appearance of reason, that barely not to admit a motion by which all the measures of the last year would have been at once over-turned and annihilated, is no proof that they have been fully justified, and warmly confirmed, since many of the transactions might have been at least doubtful, and yet this motion not have been proper.

In an affair of so great importance, my lords, an affair in which the interest of all the western world is engaged, it is necessary to take away all suspicions, when the nation is about to be involved in a war for the security of ourselves and our posterity; in a war which, however prosperous, must be at least expensive, and which is to be carried on against an enemy who, though not invincible, is, in a very high degree, powerful. It is surely proper to show, in the most publick manner, our conviction, that neither prudence nor frugality has been wanting; that the inconveniencies which will be always felt in such contentions, are not brought upon us by wantonness or negligence; and that no care is omitted by which they are alleviated, and that they may be borne more patiently, because they cannot be avoided.

This attestation, my lords, we can only give by a solemn address to his majesty of a tendency contrary to that of the motion now rejected; and by such an attestation only can we hope to revive the courage of the nation, to unite those in the common cause of liberty whom false reports have alienated or shaken, and to restore to his majesty that confidence which all the subtilties of faction have been employed to impair. I, therefore, move, that an humble address be presented to his majesty, importing, "That in the unsettled and dangerous situation of affairs in Europe, the sending a considerable body of British forces into the Austrian Netherlands, and augmenting the same with sixteen thousand of his majesty's electoral troops, and the Hessians in the British pay, and thereby, in conjunction with the queen of Hungary's troops in the Low Countries, forming a great army for the service of the common cause, was a wise, useful, and necessary measure, manifestly tending to the support and encouragement of his majesty's allies, and the real and effectual assistance of the queen of Hungary, and the restoring and maintaining the balance of power, and has already produced very advantageous consequences."

The earl of OXFORD spoke next, to the following effect:--My lords, the necessity of supporting our reputation, and of preserving the confidence of the publick, I am by no means inclined to dispute, being convinced, that from the instant in which we shall lose the credit which our ancestors have delivered down to us, we shall be no longer considered as a part of the legislature, but be treated by the people only as an assembly of hirelings and dependants, convened at the pleasure of the court to ratify its decisions without examination, to extort taxes, promote slavery, and to share with the ministry the crime and the infamy of cruelty and oppression.

For this reason, it is undoubtedly proper, that we avoid not only the crime, but the appearance of dependence; and that every doubtful question should be freely debated, and every pernicious position publickly condemned; and that when our decisions are not agreeable to the opinion or expectations of the people, we should at least show them that they are not the effects of blind compliance with the demands of the ministry, or of an implicit resignation to the direction of a party. We ought to show, that we are unprejudiced, and ready to hear truth; that our determinations are not dictated by any foreign influence, and that it will not be vain to inform us, or useless to petition us.

In these principles I agree with the noble lord who has made the motion; but in the consequences which are on this occasion to be drawn from them, I cannot but differ very widely from him; for, in my opinion, nothing can so much impair our reputation, as an address like that which is proposed; an address not founded either upon facts or arguments, and from which the nation can collect only, that the protection of this house is withdrawn from them, that they are given up to ruin, and that they are to perish as a sacrifice to the interest of Hanover.

Let us consider what we are now invited to assert, and it will easily appear how well this motion is calculated to preserve and to advance the reputation of this house. We are to assert, my lords, the propriety of a new war against the most formidable power of the universe, at a time when we have been defeated and disgraced in our conquests with a kingdom of inferiour force. We are to declare our readiness to pay and to raise new taxes, since no war can be carried on without them, at a time when our commerce, the great source of riches, is obstructed; when the interest of debts contracted during a long war, and a peace almost equally expensive, is preying upon our estates; when the profits of the trade of future ages, and the rents of the inheritances of our latest descendants, are mortgaged; and what ought yet more to affect us, at a time when the outcry of distress is universal, when the miseries of hopeless poverty have sunk the nation into despair, when industry scarcely retains spirit sufficient to continue her labours, and all the lower ranks of mankind are overwhelmed with the general calamity.

There may, perhaps, be some among your lordships who may think this representation of the state of the publick exaggerated beyond the truth. There are many in this house who see no other scenes than the magnificence of feasts, the gaieties of balls, and the splendour of a court; and it is not much to be wondered at, if they do not easily believe what it is often their interest to doubt, that this luxury is supported by the distress of millions, and that this magnificence exposes multitudes to nakedness and famine. It is my custom, when the business of the senate is over, to retire to my estate in the country, where I live without noise, and without riot, and take a calm and deliberate survey of the condition of those that inhabit the towns and villages about me. I mingle in their conversation, and hear their complaints; I enter their houses, and find by their condition that their complaints are just; I discover that they are daily impoverished, and that they are not able to struggle under the enormous burdens of publick payments, of which I am convinced that they cannot be levied another year without exhausting the people, and spreading universal beggary over the nation.

What can be the opinion of the publick, when they see an address of this house, by which new expenses are recommended? Will they not think that their state is desperate, and that they are sold to slavery, from which nothing but insurrections and bloodshed can release them? If they retain any hopes of relief from this house, they must soon be extinguished, when they find in the next clause, that we are sunk to such a degree of servility, as to acknowledge benefits which were never received, and to praise the invisible service of our army in Flanders.

If it be necessary, my lords, to impose upon the publick, let us at least endeavour to do it less grossly; let us not attempt to persuade them that those forces have gained victories who have never seen an enemy, or that we are benefited by the transportation of our money into another country. If it be necessary to censure those noble lords who have supported the former motion, and to punish them for daring to use arguments which could not be confuted; for this is the apparent tendency of the present motion; let us not lose all consideration of ourselves, nor sacrifice the honour of the house to the resentment of the ministry.

For my part, my lords, I shall continue to avow my opinion in defiance of censures, motions and addresses; and as I struggled against the former ministry, not because I envied or hated them, but because I disapproved their conduct; I shall continue to oppose measures equally destructive with equal zeal, by whomsoever they are projected, or by whomsoever patronised.

Lord CARTERET spoke next, to the following purpose:--My lords, after so full a defence of the former motion as the late debate has produced, it is rather with indignation than surprise, that I hear that which is now offered. It has been for a long time the practice of those who are supported only by their numbers, to treat their opponents with contempt, and when they cannot answer to insult them; and motions have been made, not because they were thought right by those who offered them, but because they would certainly be carried, and would, by being carried, mortify their opponents.

This, my lords, is the only intent of the present motion which can promote no useful purpose, and which, though it may flatter the court, must be considered by the people as an insult; and therefore, though I believe all opposition fruitless, I declare that I never will agree to it.

And to show, my lords, that I do not oppose the ministry for the sake of obstructing the publick counsels, or of irritating those whom I despair to defeat; and that I am not afraid of trusting my conduct to the impartial examination of posterity, I shall beg leave to enter, with my protest, the reasons which have influenced me in this day's deliberation, that they be considered when this question shall no longer be a point of interest, and our present jealousies and animosities are forgotten.

[It was carried in the affirmative, by 78 against 35.]

[THE END]
Samuel Johnson's Writings: Debate On The Army

_


Read previous: Part 5

Table of content of Debate On The Army


GO TO TOP OF SCREEN

Post your review
Your review will be placed after the table of content of this book