Part 4

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_ The question is not now, my lords, whether we shall support the queen of Hungary, but in what manner she shall be supported; and, therefore, it cannot be doubted, but that such support should be granted her as may be effectual; and I believe it will not be thought, that we can assist her without exerting an uncommon degree of vigour, and showing, that we consider ourselves as engaged in a cause which cannot be abandoned without disgrace and ruin.

If the noble lord had, before he entered upon his encomium on moderation, considered what effects could be promised from his favourite virtue, he would have had no inclination to display his eloquence upon it. By moderation, my lords, uninterrupted moderation of more than twenty years, have we become the scorn of mankind, and exposed ourselves to the insults of almost every nation in the world. By moderation have we betrayed our allies, and suffered our friendship to lose all its value; by moderation have we given up commerce to the rapacity of an enemy, formidable only for his perseverance, and suffered our merchants to be ruined, and our sailors to be enslaved. By moderation have we permitted the French to grasp again at general dominion, to overrun Germany with their armies, and to endanger again the liberties of mankind; and by continuing, for a very few years, the same laudable moderation, we shall probably encourage them to shut up our ships in our harbour, and demand a tribute for the use of the Channel.

I need not observe to your lordships, that all the great actions that have, in all ages, been achieved, have been the effects of resolution, diligence, and daring activity, virtues wholly opposite to the calmness of moderation. I need not observe, that the advantages enjoyed at present by the French are the consequences of that vigour and expedition, by which they are distinguished, and which the form of their government enables them to exert. Had they, my lords, instead of pouring armies into the Austrian dominions, and procuring, by the terrour of their troops, the election of an emperour, pursued these measures of moderation which have been so pathetically recommended, how easily had their designs been defeated?

Had they lost time in persuading the queen of Hungary by a solemn embassy to resign her dominions, or attempted to influence the diet by amicable negotiations, armies had been levied, and the passes of Germany had been shut against them; they had been opposed on the frontiers of their own dominions, by troops equally numerous and warlike with their own, and instead of imposing a sovereign on the empire, had been, perhaps, pursued into their own country.

But, my lords, whether moderation was not recommended to them by such powerful oratory as your lordships have heard, or whether its advocates met with an audience not easily to be convinced, it is plain that they seem to have acted upon very different principles, and I wish their policy had not been so strongly justified by its success. By sending an army into Germany, my lords, when there were no forces ready to oppose them, they reduced all the petty princes to immediate submission, and obliged those to welcome them as friends, who would gladly have united against them as the inveterate enemies of the whole German body; and who, had they been firmly joined by their neighbours, under a general sense of their common danger, would have easily raised an army able to have repelled them.

This, my lords, was the effect of vigour, an effect very different from that which we had an opportunity of experiencing as the consequence of moderation; it was to no purpose that we endeavoured to alarm mankind by remonstrances, and to procure assistance by entreaties and solicitations; the universal panick was not to be removed by advice and exhortations, and the queen of Hungary must have sunk under the weight of a general combination against her, had we not at last risen up in her defence, and with our swords in our hands, set an example to the nations of Europe, of courage and generosity.

It then quickly appeared, my lords, how little is to be expected from cold persuasion, and how necessary it is, that he who would engage others in a task of difficulty, should show himself willing to partake the labour which he recommends. No sooner had we declared our resolution to fulfil our stipulations, and ordered our troops to march for the relief of the queen of Hungary, than other princes discovered that they had the same dispositions, though they had hitherto thought it prudent to conceal them; that they, equally with ourselves, hated and feared the French; that they were desirous to repress their insolence and oppose their conquests, and only waited for the motions of some power who might stand at the head of the confederacy, and lead them forwards against the common enemy. The liberal promises of dominion made by the French, by which the sovereigns of Germany had been tempted to concur in a design which they thought themselves unable to oppose, were now no longer regarded; they were considered only as the boasts of imaginary greatness, which would at last vanish into air; and every one knew, that the ultimate design of Europe was to oppress equally her enemies and friends; they wisely despised her offers, and either desisted from the designs to which they had been incited by her, or declared themselves ready to unite against her.

This, my lords, has been the consequence of assembling the army, which, by the motion now under our consideration, some of your lordships seem desirous to disband, an inclination of which I cannot discover from whence it can arise.

For what, my lords, must be the consequence, if this motion should be complied with? what but the total destruction of the whole system of power which has been so laboriously formed and so strongly compacted? what but the immediate ruin of the house of Austria, by which the French ambition has been so long restrained? what but the subversion of the liberties of Germany, and the erection of an universal empire, to which all the nations of the earth must become vassals?

Should the auxiliary troops be disbanded, the queen of Hungary would find what benefit she has received from them by the calamities which the loss of them would immediately bring upon her. All the claims of all the neighbouring princes, who are now awed into peace and silence, would be revived, and every one would again believe, that nothing was to be hoped or feared but from France. The French would again rush forward to new invasions, and spread desolation over other countries, and the house of Austria would be more weakened than by the loss of many battles in its present state.

The support of the house of Austria appears not, indeed, much to engage the attention of those by whom this motion is supported. It has been represented as a house equally ambitious and perfidious with that of Bourbon, and equally an enemy both to liberty and to true religion; and a very celebrated author has been quoted to prove, that it is the interest of the Germans themselves to see a prince at their head, whose hereditary dominions may not incite him to exert the imperial power to the disadvantage of the inferiour sovereigns.

In order to the consideration of these objections, it is necessary to observe, my lords, that national alliances are not like leagues of friendship, the consequences of an agreement of disposition, opinions, and affections, but like associations of commerce, formed and continued by no similitude of any thing but interest. It is not, therefore, necessary to inquire what the house of Austria has deserved from us or from mankind; because interest, not gratitude, engages us to support it. It is useless to urge, that it is equally faithless and cruel with the house of Bourbon, because the question is not whether both shall be destroyed, but whether one should rage without control. It is sufficient for us that their interest is opposite, and that religion and liberty may be preserved by their mutual jealousy. And I confess, my lords, that were the Austrians about to attain unlimited power by the conquest or inheritance of France and Spain, it would be no less proper to form confederacies against them.

The testimony which has been produced of the convenience of a weak emperour, is to be considered, my lords, as the opinion of an author whose birth and employment had tainted him with an inveterate hatred of the house of Austria, and filled his imagination with an habitual dread of the imperial power. He was born, my lords, in Sweden, a country which had suffered much by a long war against the emperour; he was a minister to the electors of Brandenburgh, who naturally looked with envy on the superiority of Austria, and could not but wish to see a weaker prince upon the imperial throne, that their own influence might be greater; nor can we wonder, that a man thus born and thus supported should adopt an opinion by which the pride of his master would be flattered, and perhaps the interest of his own country promoted.

It is likewise, my lords, to be remarked, that there was then no such necessity for a powerful prince to stand at the head of the Germans, and to defend them with his own forces till they could unite for their own preservation. The power of France had not then arrived at its present height, nor had their monarchs openly threatened to enslave all the nations of Europe. The princes of the empire had then no oppression to fear, but from the emperour; and it was no wonder, that when he was their only enemy, they wished that his power was reduced.

How much the state of the continent is now changed, is not necessary to mention, nor what alteration that change has introduced into the politicks of all nations; those who formerly dreaded to be overwhelmed by the imperial greatness, can now only hope to be secured by it from the torrent of the power of France; and even those nations who have formerly endeavoured the destruction of Austria, may now rejoice, that they are sheltered by its interposition from tyrants more active and more oppressive.

But, my lords, though it should be granted that the house of Austria ought not to be supported, it will not, in my opinion, follow, that this motion deserves our approbation; because it will reduce us to a state of imbecility, and condemn us to stand as passive spectators of the disturbances of the world, without power and without influence, ready to admit the tyrant to whom chance shall allot us, and receive those laws which the prevailing power shall vouchsafe to transmit.

Whether we ought to support the house of Austria, to prevent its utter subversion, or restore it to its former greatness, whatever may be my private opinion, I think it not on this occasion necessary to assert; it is sufficient to induce us to reject this motion, that we ought to be at least in a condition that may enable us to improve those opportunities that may be offered, and to hinder the execution of any design that may threaten immediate danger to our commerce or our liberty.

Another popular topick, my lords, which has been echoed on the present occasion, is the happiness of peace, and the blessing of uninterrupted commerce and undisturbed security. We are perpetually told of the hazards of war, whatever may be the superiority of our skill or courage; of the certainty of the expenses, the bloodshed, and the hardships, and doubtfulness of the advantages which we may hope from them; and it is daily urged with great vehemence, that peace upon the hardest conditions is preferable to the honour of conquests, and the festivity of triumphs.

These maxims, my lords, which are generally true in the sense which their authors intended, may be very properly urged against the wild designs of ambition, and the romantick undertakings of wanton greatness; but have no place in the present inquiry, which relates to a war not made by caprice, but forced upon us by necessity; a war to which all the encomiums on peace, must in reality incite, because peace alone is the end intended to be obtained by it.

Of the necessity of peace to a trading nation it is not possible, my lords, to be ignorant; and therefore no man can be imagined to propose a state of war as eligible in itself. War, my lords, is, in my opinion, only to be chosen, when peace can be no longer enjoyed, and to be continued only till a peace secure and equitable can be attained. In the present state of the world, my lords, we fight not for laurels, nor conquests, but for existence. Should the arms of France prevail, and prevail they must, unless we oppose them, the Britons may, in a short time, no longer be a nation, our liberties will be taken away, our constitution destroyed, our religion persecuted, and perhaps our name abolished.

For the prevention of calamities like these, not for the preservation of the house of Austria, it is necessary, my lords, to collect an army; for by an army only can our liberties be preserved, and such a peace obtained, as may be enjoyed without the imputation of supineness and stupidity.

Of this the other house appears to be sufficiently convinced, and has therefore granted money for the support of the auxiliary troops; nor do I doubt but your lordships will concur with them, when you shall fully consider the motives upon which they may be supposed to have proceeded, and reflect, that by dismissing these troops, we shall sacrifice to the ambition of the French, the house of Austria, the liberties of Europe, our own happiness, and that of our posterity; and that, by resolving to exert our forces for a short time, we may place the happiness of mankind beyond the reach of attacks and violation.

Lord CARTERET replied to the following effect:--My lords, the considerations which were laid before you by the noble lords who made and seconded the motion, are so important in themselves, and have been urged with so much force and judgment, that I shall not endeavour to add any new arguments; since, where those fail which have been already offered, it is not likely that any will be effectual: but I shall endeavour to preserve them in their full force by removing the objections which have been made to them.

The first consideration that claims our attention is the reverence due to the senate, to the great council of the nation, which ought always to be consulted when any important design is formed, or any new measures adopted; especially if they are such as cannot be defeated by being made publick, and such as an uncommon degree of expense is necessary to support.

These principles, my lords, which I suppose no man will contest, have been so little regarded by the ministry on the present occasion, that they seem to have endeavoured to discover, by a bold experiment, to what degree of servility senates may be reduced, and what insults they will be taught to bear without resentment; for they have, without the least previous hint of their design, made a contract for a very numerous body of mercenaries, nor did they condescend to inform the senate, till they asked for money to pay them.

To execute measures first, and then to require the approbation of the senate, instead of advice, is surely such a degree of contempt as has not often been shown in the most arbitrary reigns, and such as would once have provoked such indignation in the other house, that there would have been no need in this of a motion like the present.

But, my lords, in proportion as the other house seems inclined to pay an implicit submission to the dictates of the ministry, it is our duty to increase our vigilance, and to convince our fellow-subjects, by a steady opposition to all encroachments, that we are not, as we have been sometimes styled, an useless assembly, but the last resort of liberty, and the chief support of the constitution.

The present design of those, who have thus dared to trample upon our privileges, appears to be nothing less than that of reducing the senates of Britain to the same abject slavery with those of France; to show the people that we are to be considered only as their agents, to raise the supplies which they shall be pleased, under whatever pretences, to demand, and to register such determinations as they shall condescend to lay before us.

This invasion of our rights, my lords, is too flagrant to be borne, though were the measures which we are thus tyrannically, required to support, really conducive in themselves to the interest of Britain, which, indeed, might reasonably have been expected; for what head can be imagined so ill formed for politicks as not to know, that the first acts of arbitrary power ought to be in themselves popular, that the advantage of the effect may be a balance to the means by which it is produced.

But these wonderful politicians, my lords, have heaped one blunder upon another; they have disgusted the nation both by the means and the end; and have insulted the senate with no other view than that of plundering the people. They have ventured, without the consent of the senate, to pursue measures, of which it is obvious that they were only kept secret because they easily foresaw that they would not be approved.

For that the hire of mercenaries from Hanover, my lords, would have been rejected with general indignation; that the proposal would have produced hisses rather than censures; and that the arguments which have been hitherto used to support it, would, if personal regards did not make them of some importance, produce laughter oftener than replies, cannot surely be doubted.

It has been said in vindication of this wise scheme, that no other troops could be obtained but those of Hanover; an assertion which I hope I may be allowed to examine, because it is yet a bare assertion without argument, and against probability; since it is generally known, how willingly the princes of Germany have on all former occasions sent out their subjects to destruction, that they might fill their coffers with their pay; nor do I doubt, but that there is now in the same country the usual superabundance of men, and the usual scarcity of money. I make no question, my lords, that many a German prince would gladly furnish us with men as a very cheap commodity, and think himself sufficiently rewarded by a small subsidy. There could be no objection to these troops from the constitution of the empire, which is not of equal force against the forces of Hanover; nor do I know why they should not rather have been employed, if they could have been obtained at a cheaper price.

The absurdity of paying levy-money for troops regularly kept up, and of hiring them at a higher rate than was ever paid for auxiliaries before, has been so strongly urged, and so fully explained, that no reply has been attempted by those who have hitherto opposed the motion; having rather endeavoured to divert our attention to foreign considerations, than to vindicate this part of the contract, which is, indeed, too shameful to be palliated, and too gross to be overlooked.

It is, however, proper to repeat, my lords, that though it cannot be confuted, it may be forgotten in the multitude of other objects, that this nation, after having exalted the elector of Hanover from a state of obscurity to the crown, is condemned to hire the troops of Hanover to fight their own cause, to hire them at a rate which was never demanded for them before, and to pay levy-money for them, though it is known to all Europe, that they were not raised on this occasion.

Nor is this the only hardship or folly of this contract; for we are to pay them a month before they march into our service; we are to pay those for doing nothing, of whom it might have been, without any unreasonable expectations, hoped, that they would have exerted their utmost force without pay.

For it is apparent, my lords, that if the designs of France be such as the noble lords who oppose the motion represent them, Hanover is much nearer to danger than Britain; and, therefore, they only fight for their own preservation; since, though they have for a single year been blessed with a neutrality, it cannot be imagined, that the same favour will be always granted them, or that the French, when they have overrun all the rest of Germany, will not annex Hanover to their other dominions.

Besides, my lords, it is well known, that Hanover is equally engaged by treaty with Britain to maintain the Pragmatick sanction, and that a certain proportion of troops are to be furnished. But, my lords, as to the march of that body of forces, I have yet heard no account. Will any lord say that they have marched? I, therefore, suppose, that the wisdom and justice of our ministers has comprehended them in the sixteen thousand who are to fatten upon British pay, and that Hanover will support the Pragmatick sanction at the cost of this inexhaustible nation.

The service which those troops have already done to the common cause, has been urged with great pomp of exaggeration, of which what effect it may have had upon others, I am not able to say; for my part, I am convinced, that the great happiness of this kingdom is the security of the established succession; and am, therefore, always of opinion, that no measures can serve the common cause, the cause of liberty, or of religion, or of general happiness, by which the royal family loses the affections of the people. And I can with great confidence affirm, that no attempt for many years has raised a greater heat of resentment, or excited louder clamours of indignation, than the hire of Hanoverian troops; nor is this discontent raised only by artful misrepresentations, formed to inflame the passions, and perplex the understanding; it is a settled and rational dislike, which every day contributes to confirm, which will make all the measures of the government suspected, and may in time, if not obviated, break out in sedition.

A jealousy of Hanover has, indeed, for a long time prevailed in the nation. The frequent visits of our kings to their electoral dominions, contrary to the original terms on which this crown was conferred upon them, have inclined the people of Britain to suspect, that they have only the second place in the affection of their sovereign; nor has this suspicion been made less by the large accessions made to those dominions by purchases, which the electors never appeared able to make before their exaltation to the throne of Britain, and by some measures which have been apparently taken only to aggrandize Hanover at the expense of Britain.

These measures, my lords, I am very far from imputing to our sovereign or his father; the wisdom of both is so well known, that they cannot be imagined to have incurred, either by contempt or negligence, the disaffection of their subjects. Those, my lords, are only to be blamed, who concealed from them the sentiments of the nation, and for the sake of promoting their own interest, betrayed them, by the most detestable and pernicious flattery, into measures which could produce no other effect than that of making their reign unquiet, and of exasperating those who had concurred with the warmest zeal in supporting them on the throne.

It is not without an uncommon degree of grief, that I hear it urged in defence of this contract, that it was approved by a very numerous council; for what can produce more sorrow in an honest and a loyal breast, than to find that our sovereign is surrounded by counsellors, who either do not know the desires and opinions of the people, or do not regard them; who are either so negligent as not to examine how the affections of the nation may be best preserved, or so rash as to pursue those schemes by which they hope to gratify the king at whatever hazard, and who for the sake of flattering him for a day, will risk the safety of his government, and the repose of his life.

It has, with regard to these troops, been asked by the noble lord who spoke last, what is the intent of this motion but to disband them? What else, indeed, can be intended by it, and what intention can be more worthy of this august assembly? By a steady pursuit of this intention, my lords, we shall regain the esteem of the nation, which this daring invasion of our privileges may be easily supposed to have impaired. We shall give our sovereign an opportunity, by a gracious condescension to our desires, to recover those affections of which the pernicious advice of flatterers has deprived him; we shall obviate a precedent which threatens destruction to our liberties, and shall set the nation free from an universal alarm. Nor in our present state is it to be mentioned as a trifling consideration, that we shall hinder the wealth of the nation from being ravished from our merchants, our farmers, and our manufacturers, to be squandered upon foreigners, and foreigners from whom we can hope for no advantage.

But it may be asked, my lords, how the great cause of liberty is to be supported, how the house of Austria is to be preserved from ruin, and how the ambition of France is to be repressed? How all this is to be effected, my lords, I am very far from conceiving myself qualified to determine; but surely it will be very little hindered by the dismission of troops, whose allegiance obliges them not to fight against the emperour, and of whom, therefore, it does not easily appear how they can be very useful allies to the queen of Hungary.

But whatever service is expected from them, it may surely, my lords, be performed by the same number of British troops; and that number may be sent to supply their place, without either delay or difficulty; I will venture to say, without any hazard. If it be objected, as it has often been, that by sending out our troops, we shall leave our country naked to invasion, I hope I may be allowed to ask, who will invade us? The French are well known to be the only people whom we can suspect of any such design. They have no fleet on this side of their kingdom, and their ships in the Mediterranean are blocked up in the harbour by the navies of Britain. We shall still have at home a body of seven thousand men, which was thought a sufficient security in the late war, when the French had a fleet equal to our own. Why we should now be in more danger from without, I cannot discover; and with regard to intestine commotions, they will be prevented by compliance with the present motion. For nothing can incite the people of Britain to oppose those who have openly dismissed the troops of Hanover.

But, my lords, I am not yet at all convinced, that the end for which those troops are said to be hired, ought to be pursued, or can be attained by us; and if the end be in itself improper or impossible, it certainly follows, that the means ought to be laid aside.

If we consider the present state of the continent, we shall find no prospect by which we can be encouraged to hazard our forces or our money. The king of Sardinia has, indeed, declared for us, and opposed the passage of the Spaniards; but he appears either to be deficient in courage, or in prudence, or in force; for instead of giving battle on his frontiers, he has suffered them, with very little resistance, to invade his territories, to plunder and insult his subjects, and to live at his expense; and it may be suspected, that if he cannot drive them out of his country, he will in time be content to purchase their departure, by granting them a passage through it, and rather give up the dominions of his ally to be ravaged, than preserve them at the expense of his own.

If we turn our eyes towards the Dutch, we shall not be more encouraged to engage in the wars on the continent; for whatever has been asserted of their readiness to proceed in conjunction with us, they appear hitherto to behold, with the most supine tranquillity, the subversion of the German system, and to be satisfied with an undisturbed enjoyment of their riches and their trade. Nor is there any appearance, my lords, that their concurrence is withheld only by a single town, as has been insinuated; for the vote of any single town, except Amsterdam, may be overruled, and the resolution has passed the necessary form, when it is opposed by only one voice.

If we take a view, my lords, of their late conduct, without suffering our desires to mislead our understandings, we shall find no reason for imagining, that they propose any sudden alteration of their conduct, which has been hitherto consistent and steady, and appears to arise from established principles, which nothing has lately happened to incline them to forsake.

When they were solicited to become, like us, the guarantees of Hanover, they made no scruple of returning, with whatever unpoliteness, an absolute refusal; nor could they be prevailed upon to grant, what we appear to think that we were honoured in being admitted to bestow. When they were called upon to fulfil their stipulation, and support the Pragmatick sanction, they evaded their own contract, till all assistance would have been too late, had not a lucky discovery of the French perfidy separated the king of Prussia from them; and what reason, my lords, can be given, why they should now do what they refused, when it might have been much more safely and more easily effected? Did they suffer the queen of Hungary to be oppressed, only to show their own power and affluence by relieving her? or can it be imagined, that pity has prevailed over policy or cowardice? They, who in contempt of their own treaties refused to engage in a cause while it was yet doubtful, will certainly think themselves justified in abandoning it when it is lost, and will urge, that no treaty can oblige them to act like madmen, or to undertake impossibilities.

I am, therefore, convinced, my lords, that they will not enter into an offensive treaty, and that they have only engaged to do what their own interest required from them, without any new stipulation, to preserve their own country from invasion by sending garrisons into the frontier towns, which they may do without any offence to France, or any interruption of their own tranquillity.

Many other treaties have been mentioned, my lords, and mentioned with great ostentation, as the effects of consummate policy, which will, I suspect, appear to be at least only defensive treaties, by which the contracting powers promise little more than to take care of themselves.

In this state of the world, my lords, when all the powers of the continent appear benumbed by a lethargy, or shackled by a panick, to what purpose should we lavish, in hiring and transporting troops, that wealth which contests of nearer importance immediately require?

It is well known to our merchants, whose ships are every day seized by privateers, that we are at war with Spain, and that our commerce is every day impaired by the depredations of an enemy, whom only our own negligence enables to resist us; but I doubt, my lords, whether it is known in Spain, that their monarch is at war with Britain, otherwise than by the riches of our nation, which are distributed among their privateers, and the prisoners who in the towns on the coast are wandering in the streets. For I know no inconvenience which they can be supposed to feel from our hostilities, nor in what part of the world the war against them is carried on. Before the war was declared, it is well remembered by whom, and with how great vehemence, it was every day repeated, that to end the war with honour we ought to take and hold. What, my lords, do we hold, or what have we taken? What has the war produced in its whole course from one year to another, but defeats, losses, and ignominy? And how shall we regain our honour, or retrieve our wealth, by engaging in another war more dangerous but less necessary? We ought surely to humble Spain, before we presume to attack France; and we may attack France with better prospects of success, when we have no other enemy to divert our attention, or divide our forces.

That we ought, indeed, to make any attempt upon France, I am far from being convinced, because I do not now discover, that any of the motives subsist which engaged us in the last confederacy. The house of Austria, though overborne and distressed, was then powerful in itself, and possessed of the imperial crown. It is now reduced almost below the hopes of recovery, and we are therefore now to restore what we were then only to support. But what, my lords, is in my opinion much more to be considered, the nation was then unanimous in one general resolution to repress the insolence of France; no hardships were insupportable that conduced to this great end, nor any taxes grievous that were applied to the support of the war. The account of a victory was esteemed as an equivalent to excises and to publick debts; and the possessions of us and our posterity were cheerfully mortgaged to purchase a triumph over the common enemy. But, my lords, the disposition of the nation with regard to the present war is very different. They discover no danger threatening them, they are neither invaded in their possessions by the armies, nor interrupted in their commerce by the fleets of France; and therefore they are not able to find out why they must be sacrificed to an enemy, by whom they have been long pursued with the most implacable hatred, for the sake of attacking a power from which they have hitherto felt no injury, and which they believe cannot be provoked without danger, nor opposed without such a profusion of expense as the publick is at present not able to bear.

It is not to be supposed, my lords, that the bulk of the British people are affected with the distresses, or inflamed by the magnanimity of the queen of Hungary. This illustrious daughter of Austria, whose name has been so often echoed in these walls, and of whom I am far from denying, that she deserves our admiration, our compassion, and all the assistance which can be given her, consistently with the regard due to the safety of our own country, is to the greatest part of the people an imaginary princess, whose sufferings or whose virtues make no other impression upon them, than those which are recorded in fictitious narratives; nor can they easily be persuaded to give up for her relief the produce of their lands, or the profits of their commerce.

Some, indeed, there are, my lords, whose views are more extensive, and whose sentiments are more exalted; for it is not to be supposed, that either knowledge or generosity are confined to the senate or the court: but these, my lords, though they perhaps may more readily approve the end which the ministry pretends to pursue, are less satisfied with the means by which they endeavour to attain it. By these men it is easily discovered, that the hopes which some so confidently express of prevailing upon the Dutch to unite with us for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, are without foundation; they see that their consent to place garrisons in the frontier towns, however it may furnish a subject of exultation to those whose interest it is to represent them as ready to concur with us, is only a new proof of what was never doubted, their unvariable attention to their own interest, since they must for their own security preserve their own barrier from being seized by France. By this act they incur no new expense, they provoke no enemies, nor give any assistance to the queen of Hungary, by which they can raise either resentment in one part, or gratitude in the other; and therefore it is not hard to perceive that, whatever is pretended, the Dutch hitherto observe the most exact laws of neutrality; and it is too evident, that if they refuse their assistance, we have very little to hope from a war with France.

Nor is this the only objection against the present measures; for it is generally, and not without sufficient reason suspected, that the real assistance of the queen of Hungary is not intended, since the troops which have been hired under that pretence, are such as cannot march against the emperour. It is known, that the Hessians have absolutely refused to infringe the constitution of the German body, by attacking him who is by a legal grant acknowledged its head; nor is it easy to conceive, why there should be a different law for Hanover than for the other electorates.

The long stay of the troops in Flanders, a place where there is no enemy to encounter, nor ally to assist, is a sufficient proof that there is nothing more designed than that the troops of Hanover shall loiter on the verge of war, and receive their pay for feasting in their quarters, and showing their arms at a review; and that they in reality design nothing but to return home with full pockets, and enjoy the spoils of Britain.

There may, indeed, be another reason, my lords, which hinders the progress of the united forces, and by which the Britons and Hanoverians may be both affected, though not both in the same degree. It is by no means unlikely, that the king of Prussia has forbidden them to advance, and declared, that the king who was chosen by his suffrage shall be supported by his arms; if this be his resolution, he is well known to want neither spirit nor strength to avow and support it; and there are reasons sufficient to convince us, that he has declared it, and that our troops are now patiently waiting the event of a negotiation by which we are endeavouring to persuade him to alter his design, if, indeed, it be desired that he should alter it; for it is not certain, that the elector of Hanover can desire the restoration of the house of Austria to an hereditary enjoyment of the imperial dignity; nor can it easily be shown why the politicks of one house, should differ from those of all the other princes of the German empire.

The other princes, my lords, have long wished for a king with whom they might treat upon the level; a king who might owe his dignity only to their votes, and who, therefore, would be willing to favour them in gratitude for the benefit. They know, that the princes of the house of Austria considered their advancement to the empire as the consequence of their numerous forces and large dominions, and made use of their exaltation only to tyrannise under the appearance of legal right, and to oppress those as sovereigns, whom they would otherwise have harassed as conquerors.

Before we can, therefore, hope for the concurrence of the princes of the empire, we must inform them of our design, if any design has been yet laid out. Is it your intention to restore the house of Austria to the full enjoyment of its former greatness? This will certainly be openly opposed by all those powers who are strong enough to make head against it, and secretly obstructed by those, whose weakness makes them afraid of publick declarations. Do you intend to support the Pragmatick sanction? This can only be done by defeating the whole power of France; and for this you must necessarily provide troops who shall dare to act against the present king. So that it appears, my lords, that we are attempting nothing, or attempting impossibilities; that either we have no end in view, or that we have made use of an absurd choice of means by which it cannot be attained. _

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