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The Fourth Treatise - CHAPTER XVII
Since those two things which it seemed needful to understand before
the text could be proceeded with have been seen and understood, it now
remains to proceed with the text and to explain it, and the text then
begins:
I say that from one root
Each Virtue firstly springs,
Virtue, I mean, that Happiness
To man, by action, brings
And I subjoin:
This, as the Ethics teach,
Is habit of right choice;
placing the whole definition of the Moral Virtues as it is defined by
the Philosopher in the second book of Ethics, in which two things
principally are understood. One is, that each Virtue comes from one
first principle or original cause; the other is, that by "Each Virtue"
I mean the Moral Virtues, and this is evident from the words, "This,
as the Ethics teach"
Hence it is to be known that our most right and proper fruits are the
Moral Virtues, since on every side they are in our power; and these
are differently distinguished and enumerated by different
philosophers. But it seems to me right to omit the opinion of other
men in that part where the divine opinion of Aristotle is stated by
word of mouth, and therefore, wishing to describe what those Moral
Virtues are, I will pass on, briefly discoursing of them according to
his opinion.
There are eleven Virtues named by the said Philosopher. The first is
called Courage, which is sword and bridle to moderate our boldness and
timidity in things which are the ruin of our life. The second is
Temperance, which is the law and bridle of our gluttony and of our
undue abstinence in those things requisite for the preservation of our
life. The third is Liberality, which is the moderator of our giving
and of our receiving things temporal. The fourth is Magnificence,
which is the moderator of great expenditures, making and supporting
those within certain limits. The fifth is Magnanimity, which is the
moderator and acquirer of great honours and fame. The sixth is the
Love of Honour, which is the moderator and regulator to us of the
honours of this World. The seventh is Mildness, which moderates our
anger and our excessive or undue patience against our external
misfortunes. The eighth is Affability, which makes us live on good
terms with other men. The ninth is called Truth, which makes us
moderate in boasting ourselves over and above what we are, and in
depreciating ourselves below what we are in our speech. The tenth is
called Eutrapelia, pleasantness of intercourse, which makes us
moderate in joys or pleasures, causing us to use them in due measure.
The eleventh is Justice, which teaches us to love and to act with
uprightness in all things.
And each of these Virtues has two collateral enemies, that is to say,
vices; one in excess and one in defect. And these Moral Virtues are
the centres or middle stations between them, and those Virtues all
spring from one root or principle, that is to say, from the habit of
our own good choice. Wherefore, in a general sense, it is possible to
say of all, that they are a habit of choice standing firm in due
moderation; and these are those which make a man happy in their active
operation, as the Philosopher says in the first book of the Ethics
when he defines Happiness, saying that Happiness is virtuous action in
a perfect life.
By many, Prudence, that is, good, judgment or wisdom, is well asserted
to be a Moral Virtue. But Aristotle numbers that amongst the
Intellectual Virtues, although it is the guide of the moral, and
points out the way by which they are formed, and without it they could
not be. Verily, it is to be known that we can have in this life two
happinesses or felicities by following two different roads, both good
and excellent, which lead us to them: the one is the Active Life and
the other is the Contemplative Life, which (although by the Active
Life one may attain, as has been said, to a good state of Happiness)
leads us to supreme Happiness, even as the Philosopher proves in the
tenth book of the Ethics; and Christ affirms it with His own Lips in
the Gospel of Luke, speaking to Martha, when replying to her: "Martha,
Martha, thou art anxious and troubled about many things: verily, one
thing alone is needful," meaning, that which thou hast in hand; and He
adds: "Mary has chosen the better part, which shall not be taken away
from her." And Mary, according to that which is previously written in
the Gospel, sitting at the feet of Christ, showed no care for the
service of the house, but listened only to the words of the Saviour.
For if we will explain this in the moral sense, our Lord wished to
show thereby that the Contemplative Life was supremely good, although
the Active Life might be good; this is evident to him who will give
his mind to the words of the Gospel.
It would be possible, however, for any one to say, in argument against
me: Since the happiness of the Contemplative Life is more excellent
than that of the Active Life, and both may be, and are, the fruit and
end of Nobility, why not rather have proceeded in the argument along
the line of the Intellectual Virtues than of the Moral? To this it is
possible to reply briefly, that in all instruction it is desirable to
have regard to the capability of the learner, and to lead him by that
path which is easiest to him. Wherefore, since the Moral Virtues
appear to be, and are, more general and more required than the others,
and are more seen in outward appearances, it was more convenient and
more useful to proceed along that path than by the other; for thus
indeed we shall attain to the knowledge of the bees by arguing of
profit from the wax, as well as by arguing of profit from the honey,
for both the one and the other proceed from them. _
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